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THE  NEW  INTRUSION
Jane Yakowitz Bambauer*
The tort of intrusion upon seclusion offers the best theory to target legiti-
mate privacy harms in the information age.  This Article introduces a new
taxonomy that organizes privacy regulations across four key stages of informa-
tion flow—observation, capture (the creation of a record), dissemination, and
use.  Privacy scholars typically propose placing constraints on the dissemina-
tion and re-use of personal information, and these dominant models are at the
heart of President Obama’s Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights.  But these restric-
tions conflict with the First Amendment and other important shared values. 
Instead, observation is the most promising stage for legal intervention.
Intrusion imposes liability for conduct—offensive observations.  The tort
is theoretically coherent and constitutionally sound because an individual’s
interests in seclusion co-exist comfortably with society’s interests in data dissemi-
nation.  This puts intrusion in stark contrast with other privacy models, where
the alleged harm is a direct consequence of an increase in knowledge.  The
classic intrusion tort can adapt sensibly to new technologies when it is reduced
to two essential elements: (1) an observation, (2) that is offensive.  This
approach vindicates privacy law’s historical roots in torts and offers a path to
principled privacy regulation.
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INTRODUCTION
Before Ralph Nader became a household name for his exposé of
the American automobile industry, Unsafe at Any Speed, General
Motors caught wind of the project and mounted an ill-fated intimida-
tion campaign.1  GM’s agents interviewed Nader’s friends and
acquaintances to gather information that might be embarrassing for
the activist—“his political, social, . . . and religious views, . . . sexual
proclivities, . . . and [odd] personal habits.”2  GM hired people to
shadow Nader incessantly.  At one point, an agent followed Nader
into a bank and got sufficiently close to see the exact denomination of
bills Nader received from the teller.3  GM also arranged for young
women to proposition him with the hopes of entrapping him into an
affair.4  Nader sued the car manufacturer.  The New York Court of
Appeals found the surveillance practices of GM’s agents could be
intrusive and tortious.5  In assessing GM’s conduct, the court famously
opined that “[a] person does not automatically make public every-
thing he does merely by being in a public place.”6
The tort of intrusion imposes liability on anyone “who intention-
ally intrudes . . . upon the . . . seclusion of another . . . if the intrusion
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.”7  The interest pro-
tected by the tort is the right to respite from observation and judg-
ment so that, when we do participate socially, we can be more
engaged and ethical participants.8  Importantly, liability for intrusion
has nothing to do with the content of the information discovered.
When GM’s spy leaned in to observe the exact denominations of bills
that Nader was receiving from the bank teller, it constituted an intru-
sion regardless of whether Nader received twenty dollars, two thou-
sand dollars, or a kitten.9  The tort’s focus on behavior, as opposed to
1 Nader v. Gen. Motors Corp., 255 N.E.2d 765, 767 (N.Y. 1970).
2 Id.
3 Id. at 771.
4 Id. at 767.
5 Id. at 771.  The other conduct, while relevant to Nader’s claim for Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress, did not constitute intrusion upon seclusion. Id. at
770.
6 Id. at 771.
7 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
8 See infra Part II for a discussion of the theoretical underpinnings of a right to
seclusion.
9 “Where there is intrusion, the intruder should generally be liable whatever the
content of what he learns.”  Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701, 705 (D.C. Cir. 1969).  The
tort “consists solely of an intentional interference with his interest in solitude or seclu-
sion, either as to his person or as to his private affairs or concerns, of a kind that
would be highly offensive to a reasonable man.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
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content, allows intrusion to coexist comfortably with the First Amend-
ment and other core liberal values that safeguard information
exchange.  The intrusion tort penalizes conduct—offensive observa-
tions—not revelations.
Intrusion has great, untapped potential to address privacy harms
created by advances in information technology.  Though the tort is
associated with conduct in real space, its principles apply just as well to
operations in the era of Big Data.  Suppose GM’s agents followed
Nader into a large retail store.  There, they observed not only Nader’s
general movement throughout the store, but his specific shopping
habits.  Suppose they made note of every product Nader browsed,
even if he did not put them in his shopping cart.  They recorded that
he replaced the box of (generically branded) Colossal Crunch with
Cap’n Crunch after seeing that the name brand cereal was on sale.
And, inexplicably, they knew he decided to come to the store after
seeing an advertisement in a newspaper he had been reading earlier
in the day.  Outlandish as this scenario would be in the physical world,
it is entirely consistent with common practices in e-commerce.
Mind-boggling quantities of personal data are logged and col-
lected every time we use our iPhones, tablets, and other gadgets.  As
companies have increasing access to our data exhaust—data detailing
what we have looked at, where we have been, and what we have
bought—scholars have become understandably concerned that the
§ 652B cmt. a (1977).  “The intrusion itself makes the defendant subject to liability,
even though there is no publication or other use of any kind of the photograph or
information outlined.” Id. cmt. b.  A few courts and jurisdictions have gotten this
wrong, and have found that seclusion cannot be intruded if the same information
could have been learned through proper means. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Price Chopper
Foods of Trumann, Inc., 220 F.3d 871, 876 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that “unautho-
rized release of medical information does not constitute highly offensive conduct
when that information could have been obtained by proper means”); Remsburg v.
Docusearch, Inc., 816 A.2d 1001, 1009 (N.H. 2003) (holding that because work
address information is “readily observable by members of the public,” no cause of
action for intrusion upon seclusion can be maintained).  These opinions miss the
heart of the tort, and are anomalous.  Some courts also use the tort of intrusion to
address harassing behavior that fits the tort of intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress better, as when a debt collector makes incessant, hostile phone calls to a person
believed to be the debtor. See, e.g., Norris v. Moskin Stores, Inc., 132 So. 2d 321, 323
(Ala. 1961) (recognizing a claim for invasion of privacy based on wrongful intrusion
when a creditor takes unreasonable actions to collect on a debt).  These, too, are not
representative of the tort.  Moreover, statutes that outlaw similar behavior (so-called
“trespass by telephone” statutes) are on constitutionally infirm ground. See, e.g., Peo-
ple v. Pierre-Louis, 2011 N.Y. Slip Op. 21254, at *4 (2011) (holding that repeated calls
to a district attorney could not be banned because of the First Amendment’s free
speech guarantee).
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information economy has thrust consumers into a new frontier with
very little rule of law or consensus of ethics to guide the treatment of
personal data.
Contemporary privacy scholarship shuns the old common law pri-
vacy torts, contending they are not relevant in the era of ubiquitous
computing.10  Instead, privacy scholars aim to give consumers control
over the information that describes them.  Paul Schwartz advocates for
a right to limit the dissemination of our personal information through
quasi-property rights and, in some circumstances, to claw it back from
the companies that have it.11  Joel Reidenberg argues that the United
States should pass comprehensive data privacy legislation comparable
to the European Union’s Data Protection Directive.12  And anticipat-
ing a First Amendment challenge to expansive privacy laws, Neil Rich-
ards argues that policymakers can (and should) regulate personal
information the way they regulate any other commodity.13  Efforts by
the legal academy and consumer advocates have inspired lawmakers,
including the Obama Administration, to put forward new laws creat-
ing property interests in our personal information.14  President
Obama’s Consumer Bill of Rights aims to give consumers “the right to
control personal information about themselves.”15  But these laws and
10 Neil M. Richards, The Limits of Tort Privacy, 9 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH L.
357, 359 (2011); see also Danielle Keats Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 98 CAL. L.
REV. 1805, 1805 (2010); Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50
STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1231 (1998); Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/Information Prop-
erty, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1304 & n.94 (2000); Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove,
Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1887, 1918 (2010); Paul M.
Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1607, 1634 (1999).
11 Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2055,
2095 (2004).
12 Joel R. Reidenberg, Restoring Americans’ Privacy in Electronic Commerce, 14 BERKE-
LEY TECH. L.J. 771, 788 (1999).
13 Neil M. Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment, 52 UCLA L.
REV. 1149, 1165, 1171–72 (2005).  The First Circuit adopted Richards’s strategy, and
ruled that prescription data held by a large data aggregator could be regulated for the
same reasons that beef jerky can.  IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42, 53 (1st Cir.
2008).  The opinion was effectively overruled by the Supreme Court’s decision in Sor-
rell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011). But see Richards, supra note 10, at 376
(noting that First Amendment rights must trump privacy interests, at least in the con-
text of the public disclosure tort, because free speech is the more important value).
14 Commercial Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2011, S. 799, 112th Cong. (2011);
Press Release, White House, Fact Sheet: Plan to Protect Privacy in the Internet Age by
Adopting a Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights (Feb. 23, 2012) [hereinafter Consumer
Privacy Bill of Rights], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/
02/23/fact-sheet-plan-protect-privacy-internet-age-adopting-consumer-privacy-b?utm_
source=wh.gov&utm_medium=shorturl&utm_campaign=shorturl.
15 Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights, supra note 14.
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proposals create rigid restrictions on the dissemination and re-use of
accurate information without fully accounting for the significant
social costs of propertizing facts.
This Article makes two contributions to the scholarly discourse—
one organizational and one normative.  First, it develops a new taxon-
omy that tracks the flow of data.  Personal information passes through
four distinct states where regulation can apply: observation, capture
(when a record is created), dissemination, and use.  While existing
taxonomies organize the theories of information privacy across the
harms experienced,16 the framework introduced here flips the orien-
tation.  First it determines how information can be regulated, and
then it analyzes the nature of the harm.  By focusing on the practical
effects of regulation, the competing interests in privacy and informa-
tion flow can be evaluated in a consistent manner.
Second, the Article employs the taxonomy to make normative
claims about the current and future state of American privacy law
among private actors.17  Popular privacy proposals, though politically
expedient, will undermine the public’s interests in innovation and
knowledge-production.  In contrast, regulation targeting information
flow at its source—at the point of observation—can be significantly
expanded without running into conceptual pitfalls.
The intrusion tort is the quintessential example of a restriction
on observation.18  This Article proposes an expansion of the intrusion
tort to fit the modern technological landscape.  Intrusion should pro-
vide recourse not for the creation of personal data, which is a neces-
sary byproduct of well-functioning technologies, but for the observation
16 Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1151 (2002).
17 Future work will use the taxonomy to assess privacy policies for information in
the state’s possession.
18 Other scholars laud the intrusion tort, though none fully develop it.  Andrew
Jay McClurg touted the virtues of intrusion and gave definition to the aims of the tort,
but ultimately gave up on the tort as helpful for any actions taken in public that are
voluntarily revealed.  Andrew Jay McClurg, Bringing Privacy Law Out of the Closet: A Tort
Theory of Liability for Intrusions in Public Places, 73 N.C. L. REV. 989, 1054 (1995).
Lyrissa Lidsky proposes the expansion of the intrusion tort through the creation of a
newsgatherer’s privilege, which could take pressure off courts that might be reluctant
to impose intrusion liability for fear of interfering with the news media’s important
functions.  Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Prying, Spying, and Lying: Intrusive Newsgathering and
What the Law Should Do About It, 73 TUL. L. REV. 173, 173 (1998).  More recently, in
describing the limitations on the tort of public disclosure, Neil Richards has con-
cluded that “the law should focus on preventing unwanted collections or accumula-
tions of information, rather than preventing the dissemination of already-collected
information” and recommends turning to the tort of intrusion to do so.  Richards,
supra note 10, at 383.
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of that data.  Since the intrusion tort is conceptually adaptable to
changing technology, legal enforcement of the right to seclusion can
expand sensibly, outlawing the most disconcerting data practices with-
out imposing unrealistic demands on industry and regulatory enforce-
ment agencies.19
A valuable side effect of this project is its vindication of American
privacy law’s origins in tort.20  Because the contours of tort law are
designed in reference to broader societal interests rather than the
interest of a single particular victim, tort is in the best position to
address new information problems.  It can target and deter practices
that eventually reveal themselves to be truly harmful without taking a
premature position on how much data is “too much.”21  The Article
joins a new wave of pragmatic privacy scholarship bringing precision
and rigor to the discourse.22  It does not recycle the First Amendment
19 Europe is experiencing increasing difficulty enforcing its strict data privacy
laws without forcing European websites and devices to adopt needlessly clunky inter-
faces.  Marisa Taylor, Europe Approves New Cookie Law, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 11, 2009, 11:13
AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2009/11/11/europe-approves-new-cookie-law/
?mod=.  The European Union is struggling to enact and make sense of the Privacy
and Electronic Communications Directive (E-Directive), which requires all European
countries to enact laws requiring websites to obtain consent before placing cookies on
computer users’ machines.  Implementation of the Directive has been so difficult that
the Information Commissioner’s Office in the United Kingdom issued a press release
announcing that enforcement would not begin for another year. See Press Release,
Information Commissioner’s Office, ICO Gives Website Owners One Year to Comply
with Cookies Law (May 25, 2011), available at http://www.ico.gov.uk/~/media/docu-
ments/pressreleases/2011/enforcement_cookies_rules_news_release_20110525.pdf;
see also Siobhain Butterworth, Cookie Law Shambles Really Takes the Biscuit, GUARDIAN
(May 27, 2011, 10:31 AM) http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/butterworth-and-bowcott-
on-law/2011/may/27/cookie-law-shambles-web-browsers.  Some commentators have
criticized the cookie law, arguing that enforcement is bound to be either arbitrary
and capricious or a fool’s errand. See, e.g., The Stupid EU Cookie Law in 2 1/2 Minutes,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ARWJA0jVPAc (last visited Sept. 11, 2012).
20 See generally Richards, supra note 10 (discussing the impact of Richards &
Solove, supra note 10); Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4
HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890) (arguing that the common law allowed for a general right to
privacy).
21 The HEW Report, drafted in 1973 and heralded as the seminal source of fair
information practices, has a subsection titled “Too Much Data.” U.S. DEPT. OF
HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS 13
(1973) [hereinafter HEW REPORT].
22 See M. Ryan Calo, The Boundaries of Privacy Harm, 86 IND. L.J. 1, 9 n.41 (2011);
see also Jacqueline D. Lipton, Mapping Online Privacy, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 477, 482–84
(2010) (acknowledging that many privacy responses, including the European Union’s
Data Protection Directive are ill equipped to respond to privacy issues inherent to
user-generated Web content); Felix T. Wu, Privacy and Utility in Data Sets, 84 U. COLO.
L. REV (forthcoming 2013).
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critiques of Eugene Volokh23 or the skepticism of Richard Posner.24
Rather, it recognizes that if privacy proposals continue to eschew rig-
orous analysis and to ignore countervailing commitments to the free
flow of facts, they will dilute the salience of concrete problems.
We proceed in four Parts.  Part I introduces the taxonomy and
shows why the dominant, property-based privacy law approach has
floundered.  Part II articulates the virtues of regulating personal infor-
mation at the source of information flow—the point of observation.
The tort of intrusion is already conceptually flexible and is poised to
be adapted to new types of invasive observations.  Part III shows how
intrusion can be applied to modern settings such as Web tracking
technologies and GPS.  Part IV shows why American law will have diffi-
culty crafting principled regulations on information flow after a legiti-
mate, legal observation has been made.
I. PERSONAL INFORMATION PROBLEMS
This Article starts from the assumption that true personal infor-
mation can cause problems.  That is, the subjects described by accu-
rate personal information can suffer losses that satisfy Ruth Gavison’s
definition of “actionable violations of privacy” because they are pre-
dictable in advance and undesirable for society.25
This Part organizes the potential risks and harms caused by per-
sonal information into a model of information flow.  It then summa-
rizes the most common scholarly responses, and concludes by showing
that the privacy law scholars’ attachment to a property-style theory of
privacy protection has blinded the Academy to better solutions that
sound in tort.
A. The Four Regulable States of Personal Information Flow
Personal information flows pass through four regulable stages:
observation, capture, dissemination, and use. Observation occurs when
information is perceived by another. Capture is the creation of a
record of the information in any medium, such as a photograph, an
audio recording, a writing, or a digital log. Dissemination is the trans-
mission of the information from one person or entity to another.  And
use occurs when a piece of information directly affects an outcome or
23 See generally Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troub-
ling Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049
(2000) (arguing that broad information privacy rules are not easily defensible under
existing free speech law).
24 RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 272 (1981).
25 Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 423 (1980).
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determination about the person described by the information.26
These four stages need not occur in any particular order.  In fact, a
stage need not occur at all.  If a police officer sees a man selling nar-
cotics (observation), he will likely arrest the man (use), and only later
complete a police report documenting the incident (capture).  If
Annie observes Lucy with a piece of toilet paper stuck to her shoe, she
might tell Candice, who then tells Lindsay.  The information will have
been observed and disseminated, but it can dissolve into the ether
without ever having passed through the stages of capture and use.
Privacy regulations place restrictions on personal information at
one or more of these four stages of information flow.  For example,
the Wiretap Act prohibits the observation of other peoples’ telephone
conversations.27  Video voyeurism laws prohibit certain types of video
capture.28  The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of
1996 (“HIPAA”) restricts the dissemination of health records.29  The
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 prohibits the use of disability
information in employment decisions.30  Some privacy laws craft com-
plex restrictions over multiple stages, but the varied parts of these reg-
ulations nevertheless can be organized across these four stages.31
26 This matches the European Union Data Protection Directive, which imposes
limitations when data is “used for taking measures or decisions regarding any particu-
lar individual.”  Directive 95/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, art. 13(2), 1995 O.J. (L 281)
31, 42, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:
31995L0046:en:HTML (last visited Oct. 11, 2012) [hereinafter EU Data Protection
Directive].
27 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2006).
28 Video Voyeurism Prevention Act, id. § 1801.
29 Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 18, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).
30 Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
31 The EU Data Protection Directive bans the “processing” of data without the
subjects’ consent.  Processing is “any operation or set of operations which is per-
formed upon personal data, whether or not by automatic means, such as collection,
recording, organization, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use,
disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or
combination, blocking, erasure or destruction.”  EU Data Protection Directive, supra
note 26, art. (2)(b).  Processing could constitute a distinct stage in the information R
flow, along with observation, capture, dissemination, and use.  But while processing
might mark a distinct phase, it is not one that is “regulable” under the First Amend-
ment or the American normative commitments to information.  Regulations proscrib-
ing the analysis of accurate data do not weed out inferences and heuristics.  Instead,
they invite inferences based on hunch.  Moreover, if a relationship between two char-
acteristics is very strong, processing can be so unavoidable as to be indistinguishable
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The stages are natural points for regulation because the risk of
harm associated with a piece of information changes when it enters
each new stage.  A personal fact can only cause so much damage if it is
never captured in a medium that can be easily shared and stored.
Likewise, the chance of harm is limited if a piece of information is
constrained from flowing beyond a narrow set of people (such as a
person’s attorney or physician).  These four stages thus provide us
with sensible points at which to assess the risk of privacy harms and
the wisdom of public laws that might operate on each stage.32
B. The Privacy Law Solutions
Privacy scholarship promotes the use of law to protect interests in
dignity, autonomy, and self-determinism.  These interests are served
by giving people some control over others’ acquaintance with their
personal affairs.33  By exercising control over others’ knowledge of
ourselves, we can avoid judgment, ridicule, or stereotyping (preserv-
ing dignity) while we comfortably pursue the activities we would like
(maintaining autonomy).
Given this orientation, it is not surprising that the solutions put
forward by privacy scholars tend to impose stringent restrictions at the
from thought.  Since processing is so difficult to detect, as a practical matter privacy
laws are better off operating earlier or later in the information stream.
32 Daniel Solove’s taxonomy of privacy problems can map directly onto these
four stages.  Surveillance (clandestine observation), identification, and fruitful inter-
rogations occur at the “observation” stage.  Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy,
154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 491–99 (2006) (explaining that “identification” is the attach-
ment of an identity to a previously anonymous piece of information, so it allows an
observation about the identified person for the first time, even if the information
were already observed in anonymized form).  Aggregation occurs at the “capture”
stage since the stage includes the presumed indefinite storage of a record. Id. at
506–11.  Exclusion and security occur at the “dissemination” stage, as do all of the
privacy problems in Solove’s “information dissemination” family—breach of confi-
dentiality, disclosure, exposure, increased accessibility, blackmail, appropriation, and
distortion. Id. at 522–52.  Secondary uses are, obviously, “uses” under my framework.
Id. at 520–21.  Solove’s interference family of privacy problems do not map cleanly
onto my framework because “intrusions,” as Solove categorizes them, include harass-
ing acts that are best treated as something other than information-related.  “Deci-
sional interferences” are actually observation harms—the chilling effects that can
result from government inquiry or surveillance of certain types of acts. Id. at 557–62.
33 Gavison, supra note 25, at 426 (quoting Hyman Gross’s definition of privacy).
Gavison finds this definition unhelpful and puts forward her own definition of privacy
interests, which break into the categories of secrecy, anonymity, and solitude. Id. at
428.
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dissemination and use stages of information flow.34  They demand
that ultimate control over the fate of personal information be left in
the hands of the information subject.  In Code, Lawrence Lessig asks
what presumptive controls consumers should have over the data that
they deliberately reveal to others.35  His legal proposals include a ban
on the sale of consumer data unless the customers expressly consent
to the transfer.36  In some cases Lessig suggests privacy should be ina-
lienable; that is, consumers should be legally incapable of consenting
to the dissemination of information.37  Paul Schwartz has argued that
Americans should have a sort of property right in information that
describes them—that is, they should have an exclusive right to deter-
mine where their personal information goes, and how it is used.38
Recognizing that a simple property model could lead rationally igno-
rant consumers to sell their information for too little compensation,
Schwartz also argues that government regulation should provide a
mechanism for the data subject to claw back information they had
previously consented to release.  In Schwartz’s scheme, certain types
of especially sensitive information should be subject to inalienable
prohibitions on the reuse or dissemination.39  Jerry Kang’s proposals
are very similar.40
These proposals and others coming out of the privacy literature
reflexively reach for the broad-sweeping prohibitions on disclosure
and repurposing incorporated into the European Union’s Data Pro-
tection Directive.41  Use limitations, notice, and consent are central
34 See generally Solove, supra note 32, at 564 (“Modern privacy problems emerge R
not just from disclosing deep secrets, but from making obscure information more
accessible (increased accessibility) or from consistent observation or eavesdropping
(surveillance).”).  Fully half of the privacy problems identified in Daniel Solove’s
influential privacy taxonomy take place at the dissemination stage, which implies that
the regulatory solutions would have to constrain these disseminations. Id. at 525–552.
35 LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE VERSION 2.0, 6–8 (2d ed. 2006).
36 Id. at 223.
37 Id. at 227.
38 Schwartz, supra note 11, at 2058; see also LESSIG, supra note 35, at 142–63 (argu- R
ing property rights should be used to protect Internet privacy); Jerry Kang & Benedikt
Buchner, Privacy in Atlantis, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 229, 232 (2004) (indicating that
the property right approach would result in personal data being exchanged through
free market interactions).
39 Schwartz, supra note 11, at 2098.
40 Kang & Buchner, supra note 38, at 255–56.
41 See LESSIG, supra note 35, at 227–28; A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Pri- R
vacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461, 1461 (2000); Litman, supra note 10, at 1290; Marc Roten- R
berg, Fair Information Practices and the Architecture of Privacy (What Larry Doesn’t Get),
2001 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 33 (2001) (noting the effort to protect an individual’s
privacy); see also Kang & Buchner, supra note 38, at 246, 255.  Kang notes several
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tenets in European data privacy laws.42  These tenets were originally
developed by the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
in the influential Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPs), but
American law has never required private (non-state) actors to adhere
to FIPs.43  Both the EU’s Data Protection Directive and FIPs require
notice and consent before information may be disseminated or used
for any purpose other than the one for which the information was
collected, so regulations that implement these rules necessarily place
near-complete restrictions on the regulable stages of dissemination and
use.44
The differences between the American and European treatments
of information privacy are essentially differences in initial entitle-
ments.  In Europe, information about a person is theirs.  The EU Data
Protection Directive and President Obama’s proposed Consumer Pri-
vacy Bill grant a property entitlement over personal information to
the person described by it.  The entitlement does not necessarily
incorporate the full “bundle of sticks” we have in our chattels and real
property, but it does include the most important ones—exclusive con-
trol over use and transfer.  An entity is required to obtain consent or
differences between the property model and the EU Data Protection Directive, believ-
ing that the former springs from an orientation toward market solutions while the
latter is designed to protect dignity. Id. at 231–36.  But Kang recognizes that the two
models both place initial entitlements in the hands of the individuals described in the
data. Id. at 255.  The property proposals from the privacy literature incorporate other
protections to prevent the completely free alienability of personal information, so in
practice the difference between these approaches would not be as distinct as Kang
suggests.
42 EU Data Protection Directive, supra note 26.  The European Commission’s R
recently released draft regulations would amend the EU Data Protection Directive to
add a new right to data deletion, a “right to be forgotten,” which requires data con-
trollers to delete information upon request, even if the data subject had consented to
the collection of the information.  Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Process-
ing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, at 9, COM (2012) 56
draft (Nov. 29, 2011).
43 HEW REPORT, supra note 21; Rotenburg, supra note 41.  Rotenburg laments R
that industry lobbyists do not appreciate and account for the fact that Fair Informa-
tion Practices were developed by American congressmen. Id. at 15.  This is an odd
criticism since, as Rotenburg acknowledges, FIPs were designed to be an agreement
about how the federal government should treat personal data, not private parties. Id.
at 3 & n.11.  Some sectors of American enterprise are governed by industry-specific
privacy regulations such as the Video Privacy Protection Act and the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA).  These are discussed at length in Part IV,
infra.
44 EU Data Protection Directive, supra note 26, at 41; HEW REPORT, supra note
21.
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negotiate a license before storing, sharing, or reusing personal infor-
mation, even when that information is revealed in the course of a
transaction.  Current American privacy law, by contrast, was developed
through tort, where privacy interests are protected only when courts
recognize an actionable injury and fault-worthy behavior outweighs
other public policy considerations.45
The property rights trend in the literature shows that scholars
have grown frustrated with American privacy law’s roots in tort.46
Though the earliest vindications of privacy rights emanated from com-
mon law tort claims and coalesced, eventually, into the recognizable
set that William Prosser dubbed the “privacy torts,”47 the most influen-
tial American privacy scholars have become increasingly frustrated by
the void in uniform, overarching privacy policy.48  They fear that
courts are standing idly by as “[t]he Internet guarantees a Nietzschean
‘eternal return’ of damaging disclosures.”49  They advocate for a fun-
damental shift in the model for privacy protection to combat a perpet-
ual threat.  As Jacqueline Lipton puts it, “We may not have time to
develop expectations of privacy that are reasonable before the new
wave of privacy-threatening technologies develops and overtakes those
expectations.”50
45 See generally William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960) (describing
four types of privacy invasion); Warren & Brandeis, supra note 20 (contemplating
several restrictions on the right to privacy, including the need to show special
damages).
46 See, e.g., Citron, supra note 10, at 1809–10 (criticizing the privacy torts for fail-
ing to recognize new, increased quantities of harm, but also encouraging privacy law
to expand from its common law tort roots); Kang, supra note 10, at 1231; Litman,
supra note 10, at 1304; Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights in Personal Information: An
Economic Defense of Privacy, 84 GEO. L. REV. 2381, 2397 (1996); Richards, supra note 10,
at 357; Richards & Solove, supra note 10, at 1918; Schwartz, supra note 10, at 1634; see
generally DANIEL SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION 122–29 (2007) (arguing that
tort law continues to play an important role as a deterrent for individuals who spread
rumors or spill secrets); Patricia Sánchez Abril, Recasting Privacy Torts in a Spaceless
World, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2007) (reconstructing the tort of public disclosure to
avoid the “scattershot” nature of existing precedent).
47 Prosser, supra note 45, at 389.
48 Froomkin, supra note 41, at 1523–24; Kang & Buchner, supra note 38, at
235–36; Richards, supra note 10, at 359–61 (suggesting that other torts and the expan-
sion of confidentiality duties can be used to meet new privacy demands); Solove,
supra note 32, at 477–78. R
49 Citron, supra note 10, at 1813 (citing FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE GAY SCIENCE
194–95 (Bernard Williams ed., Josefine Nauckoff trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 2001)
(1887)).
50 Lipton, supra note 22, at 501. R
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The property approach certainly has its appeal.  A property rule
would allow consumers who have strong preferences for privacy to opt
out of data aggregations.  This works well if society prefers for Ameri-
cans to decide for themselves what the value of their privacy may be.51
And, as with real property, personal information property would allow
some Americans to be data holdouts if it is important to them, even if
that choice seems irrational.52  A property system favors the autonomy
and self-determination of information subjects over competing inter-
ests, such as information access and economic efficiency.  It prioritizes
privacy, so it is naturally attractive to anyone believing that privacy is
not sufficiently guarded today.
Another attractive feature of a property right is its imposition of
transaction costs.  If an entity must provide notice and obtain consent
before collecting or reusing personal data, it will incur non-negligible
costs in the process.  The data collected must meet some threshold
amount of value to be worth the bother of collecting it.  As long as
transaction costs are non-zero, they will dampen the overall amount of
data collected (even from willing consumers).53  Privacy scholars who
are interested in harnessing the power of defaults, and in using trans-
action costs to curb overall collection efforts, are obviously interested
in something other than consumer autonomy.  Paul Schwartz argues
that, since consumers cannot be expected to understand the full
extent of the privacy consequences when they are asked to consent to
data collection, they are likely to trade away their personal informa-
tion for too little in return.54  Transaction costs can indirectly counter-
51 A property rule would avoid what privacy scholars perceive to be unjust enrich-
ment; since information has value, privacy scholars view the collection of data to be a
sort of theft.  Eugene Volokh describes and responds to this argument.  Volokh, supra
note 23, at 1074.  Empirical research suggests this value will be quite small for most R
Americans, anyway. IAN AYRES, SUPER CRUNCHERS 197 (2007) (citing studies that
found most people were willing to disclose their social security numbers in exchange
for fifty-cent-off coupons); Eric Goldman, The Privacy Hoax, FORBES, Oct. 14, 2002, at
42, available at http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2002/1014/042.html.  But as with real
property, a right to information property would allow some Americans to be data
holdouts.
52 Murphy, supra note 46, at 2397 (“Given anonymity, people will do what they R
want.”).
53 Cf. Froomkin, supra note 41, at 1535 (“Ironically, the advances in technology R
that are reducing the transactions [sic] costs . . . also work to facilitate the sale of
personal data, potentially lowering the cost enough to make the purchase worth-
while.”). But see Litman, supra note 10, at 1299 (voicing skepticism that transaction R
costs will be significant, and noting that the real issues at stake are the allocations of
the entitlements).
54 Schwartz, supra note 11, at 2091. R
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act the information asymmetries that operate between companies and
their customers.
The property model has gained traction.  Virtually every lawsuit
testing the legality of information collection, including legal chal-
lenges against Google, Netflix, DoubleClick, AOL, and Apple, has
included claims based on trespass to chattels on the theory that infor-
mation about a person is their personal property.  The Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) is influenced by current privacy scholarship, and
has incorporated the dissemination and re-use limitations from the
Fair Information Practice principles directly into its proposed frame-
work for protecting consumer privacy.55  The legal settlements the
FTC has negotiated with major data aggregators like DoubleClick
include strict prohibitions on dissemination and repurposing of per-
sonal data, suggesting that dissemination and reuse are per se unfair
consumer practices.56  But even if this shift to a subject-control model
has the support of the FTC at present, the control model is inherently
unstable and unlikely to work long-term.
C. The Problems With Privacy Law Solutions
Americans and Europeans have historically had very different
relationships to information.57  Our enduring commitment to liber-
alism automatically places great value on unfettered access to facts.58
55 See FTC STAFF REP., PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID
CHANGE 6–7 (2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/12/101201privacy
report.pdf.  This is particularly odd since the Federal Trade Commission’s consumer
protection duties requires the FTC and the plaintiffs’ bar to detect fraud and identify
likely victims, both of which are improbable without the aid of data.
56 See Official Court Notice of Settlement In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig.,
Master File No. 00-CIV-0641; see also Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC
Announces Settlement with Bankrupt Website, Toysmart.com, Regarding Alleged Pri-
vacy Policy Violations (July 21, 2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/07/
toysmart2.shtm.
57 James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113
YALE L.J. 1151, 1155–60 (2004).
58 The inherent value of information is expressed by the influential writings by
John Stuart Mill:
Wrong opinions and practices gradually yield to fact and argument: but facts
and arguments, to produce any effect on the mind, must be brought before
it.  Very few facts are able to tell their own story, without comments to bring
out their meaning.  The whole strength and value, then, of human judg-
ment, depending on the one property, that it can be set right when it is
wrong, reliance can be placed on it only when the means of setting it right
are kept constantly at hand.
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 39 (1869).
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In contrast, the Fair Information Practice principles (FIPs) that form
the bedrock of European privacy law grew out of a distrust of data.
FIPs were developed in the 1970s, in an era when computational
power and data storage did not have great presence outside the fed-
eral government.  Though the Department of Health, Education &
Welfare’s (HEW) report drafting committee had hoped Congress
would apply its recommendations to all systems of personal data col-
lection,59 the harms anticipated by the report were distinctly govern-
mental.60  While political processes are appropriate tools to constrain
how the state collects and uses data, those same processes, when
directed at facts in private hands, are troubling.  Consider, for exam-
ple, the purpose limitations of FIPs, which constrain a holder of data
from using it for any purpose other than that for which it was col-
lected.  This rule allows privacy interests to trump other important
societal values.  Imaginative repurposing of data is now common prac-
tice for public health61 and security,62 sports and entertainment,63
59 The HEW Report recommended the submission of legislative proposals to
Congress to “establish a code of fair information practice for all automated personal
data systems maintained by agencies of the Federal government or by organizations
within reach of the authority of the Federal government.” HEW REPORT, supra note 21, at
136 (emphasis added).
60 The examples in the chapter titled “Latent Effects of Computer-Based Record
Keeping,” which describes privacy harms, include fears of dragnet-style investigation
processes, inaccurate welfare distributions, and the FBI’s clearinghouse of criminal
files. See id. at 12–30.
61 Internet search terms can reveal epidemiological trends faster than the Center
for Disease Control. See Alexis Madrigal, Google Could Have Caught Swine Flu Early,
WIRED (Apr. 29, 2009, 3:40 PM), http://www.wired.com/wiredscience/2009/04/
google-could-have-caught-swine-flu-early; Melinda Wenner, Google Flu Trends Do Not
Match CDC Data, POPULAR MECHANICS (May 17, 2010, 9:15 AM), http://www.popular
mechanics.com/science/health/med-tech/google-flu-trends-cdc-data.  The flu can
infect an area without causing the fever and respiratory problems that are typically
Googled.  What Google Flu Trends tracks is better understood as tracking flu-like
symptoms rather than actual confirmed influenza outbreaks.
62 Backlogs of crime victim reports and other data have allowed experimental law
enforcement programs to use analytics to predict more accurately where larceny and
other crimes are most likely to happen and when.  The most cutting-edge programs
can provide predictions as focused as a one square-block area. See Erica Goode, Send-
ing the Police Before There’s a Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2011, at A11, available at http:/
/www.nytimes.com/2011/08/16/us/16police.html.
63 Baseball, which has rewarded fans and team owners who have the patience and
aptitude for statistics, is about to undergo another data renaissance with the help of a
new technology called Fieldf/x, which records every single motion of each player at
every game.  If it works as promised, the corrective statistics made popular by
Moneyball may prove to be completely outmoded.  Also, baseball’s league awards and
pay structure might become one of the most meritocratic systems known to exist.  Ira
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and even core political activities, as demonstrated by the role of Digi-
tal Strategy Analysts in the 2012 Obama campaign, who will analyze
web traffic data, email results, social media, SMS data, and other digi-
tal information to provide insights for the President’s reelection
team.64  FIPs, though American in origin, are foreign to the regulatory
environment that produced the hyper-efficiency of Walmart and the
crowdsourced machine learning of Google.
This Subpart first examines constitutional limitations on treating
personal information as property, and then demonstrates why a prop-
erty model is unwise as a matter of public policy.
1. Constitutional Constraints
If a property model for privacy is incorporated into law, it will
face a constitutional challenge.  Restrictions on the flow of facts—
even dry, unadorned facts about people—will receive heightened First
Amendment scrutiny from the current Supreme Court.65  A default
rule that automatically assigns one person exclusive control over
another’s ability to spread accurate information is likely to be treated
as a restriction on speech, and will have to be justified by, and nar-
rowly tailored to, a compelling state interest.66
Defenders of a property rule for personal information might be
able to avoid constitutional scrutiny by exploiting a loophole.  Infor-
Boudway, Baseball Set for Data Deluge as Player Monitoring Goes Hi-Tech, BLOOMBERG
(Mar. 31, 2011, 5:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-03-31/baseball-is-
set-for-deluge-in-data-as-monitoring-of-players-goes-hi-tech.html.
64 See Jim Rutenberg & Jeff Zeleny, Obama Mines for Voters with High-Tech Tools,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2012, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/08/
us/politics/obama-campaigns-vast-effort-to-re-enlist-08-supporters.html?pagewanted=
all.
65 Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2667 (2011) (“Facts, after all, are
the beginning point for much of the speech that is most essential to advance human
knowledge and to conduct human affairs.  There is thus a strong argument that pre-
scriber-identifying information is speech for First Amendment purposes.”).  Lawrence
Lessig and Neil Richards have argued that personal data is not “expression” and
therefore should not be the basis for First Amendment protection. See Richards,
supra note 13, at 1154–55.  As a descriptive matter, IMS Health has put these argu-
ments in doubt.  As a normative matter, I agree with the broader views of the First
Amendment, articulated by Derek Bambauer and Eugene Volokh, among others, that
in deciding whether a First Amendment protection applies in the first place, we ought
not allow the courts to decide which types of information count as “speech” and
which do not.  Derek E. Bambauer, Orwell’s Armchair, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming
2012).  Moreover, a test that assigns less protection to expressions that have a higher
proportion of dry factual information puts undue emphasis on the proportion of an
expression that is made from opinion and point-of-view.
66 See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 527–28 (2001).
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mation is frequently propertized without running afoul of the First
Amendment when it is cast as intellectual property.  After all, copy-
right, trademark, the right to publicity, and trade secrets laws restrict
the flow of accurate information.  The field might have room for pri-
vacy rights, too.  An extension of the right of publicity, traditionally a
celebrity’s claim, to a right to personal information property requires
but one small hop in reasoning.67  Consider the precedent set by Rosa
Parks, icon of the American Civil Rights Movement.  Parks brought a
right of publicity claim against OutKast’s record label for the refer-
ence to her story in their song “Rosa Parks.”68  The chorus to the Out-
Kast song repeats the words:
Ah ha, hush that fuss
Everybody move to the back of the bus
Do you want to bump and slump with us
We the type of people make the club get crunk.69
Parks claimed that OutKast’s song exploited the commercial
value of her identity.70  Surprisingly, the Sixth Circuit did not believe
that the record label was entitled to summary judgment on their First
Amendment defense.  According to the court, Parks presented a gen-
uine issue of material fact over the relevance of her name to the
song’s meaning.71  The prima facie case for a right to publicity claim is
quite easy to establish,72 so without a strong First Amendment limita-
67 Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Warren and Brandeis Redux: Finding (More) Privacy
Protection in Intellectual Property Lore, 1999 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 8, ¶¶ 14–23 (1999);
Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Information As Speech, Information As Goods: Some
Thoughts On Marketplaces and the Bill of Rights, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 665, 717 (1992)
(discussing the effect the right of publicity has on speech).  Right of publicity claims
are often lumped under the banner of “misappropriation.”  I distinguish for the pur-
poses of this Article between the tort claim of misappropriation, which protects ordi-
nary people from receiving unwanted and unconsented exposure when their images
or names are used to sell commercial products, from intellectual property claims for
the right of publicity, which are concerned with the commercial mining and exploita-
tion of celebrity’s fame without the celebrity’s permission.  For the contrast, see, for
example, Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 836 (6th Cir. 1983)
(permitting recovery when Johnny Carson’s celebrity was exploited to market port-a-
potties).
68 Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 441 (6th Cir. 2003).
69 Id. at 442–43.
70 Id. at 461.
71 Id. at 442.
72 Id. at 460 (“All that a plaintiff must prove in a right of publicity action is that
she has a pecuniary interest in her identity, and that her identity has been commer-
cially exploited by a defendant.”).
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tion, a non-celebrity might be able to claim a property interest in the
value of references to her, and facts about her experiences.73
But courts are unlikely to make the leap from celebrity rights of
publicity to consumer rights of publicity, small as it may be.  Intellec-
tual property rights are justified as exceptions to First Amendment
restrictions because they work in service of the First Amendment’s
goals—the production of information and ideas.  In theory, intellec-
tual property rights provide economic incentives for the labor
required to produce new information goods.74  The incentive theory
doesn’t work for privacy rights.  Privacy-motivated information prop-
erty rules attempt to curb the production of information, not to foster
it.75  Moreover, the Parks case notwithstanding, intellectual property
rights propertize the form or expression of an idea, not the idea
itself.76  Raw facts generally cannot be propertized.77  Intellectual
property scholars are often reluctant to endorse a property entitle-
ment over these last vestiges of free speech limitations, even in the
pursuit of privacy.78
2. Normative Constraints
Even putting aside First Amendment limitations, privacy scholars
have not explained why a property right to control the dissemination
73 This extension of the right of publicity would correspond to Rochelle
Dreyfuss’s descriptive theory of intellectual property—that courts assign property
rights wherever there is value.  Dreyfuss, supra note 67, at ¶ 16. R
74 See Zimmerman, supra note 67, at 667–68; see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. R
186, 205–06, 214–15 (2003); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 307 (1980).
75 Under a labor desert theory, it is very likely the data aggregator who will be
seen to invest effort in creating a usable and probative set of personal information
since personal information is only as valuable as its data quality.  To understand the
effort required to create and maintain usable data, see THOMAS C. REDMAN, DATA
DRIVEN 53–86 (2008).
76 Zimmerman, supra note 67, at 682. R
77 Kang & Buchner, supra note 38, at 233; Volokh, supra note 23, at 1066.  Hot R
news misappropriation is an exception to the general proposition that facts cannot be
property. See Int’l News. Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 216 (1918).  But
again, this exception rests on a labor desert theory that aims to reward the production
of information.
78 Even Rochelle Dreyfuss, who enunciated the clearest jurisprudential path to
propertization of personal information, advised against widening the scope of intel-
lectual property since the recent expansions of intellectual property have been
unprincipled.  Dreyfuss, supra note 67, ¶ 25; see also LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE R
10 (2004) (arguing that the change in creative property laws aimed at eliminating
piracy can also eliminate “our culture of values”); Zimmerman, supra note 67, at 667 R
(worrying that the expansion of intellectual property theories is “cannibalizing speech
values at the margin”).
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and use of truthful personal information would improve social welfare
instead of detracting from it.  To illustrate, consider a map graphically
illustrating the proportion of African-Americans by census tract.  This
map would fall short of the definition of “political discourse” that pri-
vacy scholars acknowledge must be immunized by the First Amend-
ment.79  Moreover, by reporting information on race, the map would
violate the more aggressive privacy proposals requiring consent from
data subjects even before aggregated, de-identified information may
be disseminated.80  But it takes just one small addition—the inclusion
of voting district boundaries—to turn a dry collection of data into a
message teeming with political meaning.  It was, after all, a map that
led to the coining of the term “gerrymandering.”  The bounds of
Essex County, Massachusetts, were molded into a shape that resem-
bled a salamander and was politically convenient for the reelection of
Governor Elbridge Gerry.81  Why should we risk granting exclusive
property rights in facts like those to the individuals described in the
map?
Usually property entitlements and liability rules are assigned in a
way that best ameliorates market information problems.  In fact, schol-
ars often attempt to design entitlement systems that have the effect of
forcing information disclosures since information, by assumption,
helps correct market inefficiencies.82  To understand why property
entitlements do not work very well with personal information, first
consider why they do work so well with tangible objects.83  Lisa owns a
coffee mug, and knows what it is worth to her better than a court, or
the state, or some objective third party does.  Likewise, Milhouse, a
putative buyer, is in the best position to estimate what the coffee mug
is worth to him.  If Milhouse values the mug more than Lisa, then a
transaction should occur, the buyer and seller will both experience an
increase in utility, and overall social welfare will improve.  A third
party’s judgment couldn’t possibly be superior because Lisa and
79 Richards, supra note 10, at 376–77. R
80 Lee Tien, the staff attorney for the Electronic Frontier Foundation, proposes a
statute requiring consent to be obtained before de-identified data can be released.
Natasha Singer, Data Privacy, Put to the Test, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2011, at BU3, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/01/business/01stream.html.
81 The Birth of the Gerrymander, MASS. HIST. SOC. (Sept. 2008), http://www.
masshist.org/objects/2008september.cfm.
82 LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 411 (2002); Ian
Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate
Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1031–32 (1995).
83 Much of this example is borrowed from Richard Posner. RICHARD POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 37–38 (5th ed. 1998).
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Milhouse have significant private information about how they would
use the mug, and about their tastes and preferences.
A market for information, or more precisely, a market for rights
to disseminate information, has a number of quirks and difficulties.
First, information is a nonrivalrous good—everybody can have it at
once.  If Lisa could keep her mug and give it to Milhouse at the same
time, it is no longer obvious that Lisa should have exclusive rights to
it.  Also, information problems are definitional.  The value of a piece
of personal information is very difficult for the information subject to
determine, and it is impossible for the would-be purchaser, since the
utility of new facts are hard to predict and are diffused across the
entire population who may eventually come into contact with it.  Two
illustrations will help show why the property model is a poor fit.
First, consider the easy, Posnerian case against property rights.84
Suppose a man desires to conceal his marriage to the women he
meets on Match.com.  A woman who uncovered his secret after several
dates wishes to describe his behavior on TrueDater.com, a website that
allows people to report complaints about members of online dating
services.85  The married man will demand a high price for a license to
TrueDater to distribute this information.  Under these facts, the
holdout problem is obvious.  The people who might value the infor-
mation most—Match.com users who are looking for truthful part-
ners—don’t know what they are missing, and are unlikely to be
organized enough to purchase his consent.86  The social value of
information dissemination—both to the specific Match.com users
who have the misfortune of dating him and to the general public,
which would prefer to deter adultery through disapproval—would eas-
ily outweigh the man’s utility in secrecy.  In fact, we might even think
that a preference for secrecy in these circumstances is an “objectiona-
ble preference” that should not be accorded any weight in the social
welfare calculus (or put differently, that notions of justice and fairness
ought to trump the adulterer’s privacy interests).87  But under a prop-
84 This example is similar to Richard Posner’s example of the sexually abusive
school teacher.  Richard Posner, The Economics of Privacy, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 405, 406
(1981).
85 Lizette Alvarez, (Name Here) Is a Liar and a Cheat, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2006, at
G1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/16/fashion/thursdaystyles/16
WEB.html?pagewanted=all.
86 Even if there were a business model for TrueDater, similar to the CarFax
model, the married man will charge an exorbitant price or hold out entirely.  These
problems do not plague businesses like CarFax that rely on records that are not under
the control of the individuals selling the cars.
87 KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 82, at 427.  Kaplow and Shavell would object to R
characterizing these valuation decisions as decisions driven by concerns for fairness,
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erty model, the information exchange would not happen, and the
bulk of social costs would fall on a few “local losers” who end up dat-
ing him without knowing his true motivations.
The potential for fraud, deceit, and other perverse incentives is
the most commonly deployed critique of privacy coming out of the
law and economics literature.88  But this critique is too facile; just
because privacy could be abused does not necessarily mean that the
model is deeply theoretically flawed.  After all, opportunistic holdouts
in real estate markets are a known and difficult problem, but they do
not merit the abolishment of property rights.89  The relevant question
is whether even the ethical and reasonable personal information hold-
outs would tend to detract from overall social welfare.  Indeed they
would.
Consider the much more sympathetic facts of Sipple v. Chronicle
Publishing Co.90  In 1975, Oliver Sipple was living an openly gay life in
San Francisco, but like so many men in the gay community at the
time, his sexual preference was not known to his family.  When Presi-
dent Gerald Ford visited San Francisco that year, Oliver Sipple saved
his life by thwarting an assassination attempt.  He struck the gun out
of the hand of Sara Jane Moore, who was standing near Sipple during
President Ford’s public appearance.  Sipple instantly became a
national hero, but his story took a sad turn when several newspapers
printed quotes from Harvey Milk suggesting that President Ford’s hes-
itation to call or telegram Sipple with an expression of gratitude was
caused by homophobia.  The news reached Sipple’s family in Detroit,
and they subsequently disowned him.  He passed away just five years
after his unsuccessful lawsuit against the San Francisco Chronicle and
other newspapers, penniless and devoid of valuable possessions save
but the authors struggle, as others had before them, to find any pure economic ratio-
nale for dismissing and ignoring certain types of idiosyncratic preferences, such as
preferences for sadism. Id.  Richard Murphy preferred not to count the utility
derived from deceit in his social utility calculus.  Murphy, supra note 46, at 2386.  I
agree with this impulse, but note that it highlights a larger problem with utilitarian
theories that command the analyst to make decisions, based on ethics, about what
types of pleasure should and should not count as utility.
88 Posner, supra note 84, at 406. R
89 Moreover, sometimes property rights are extinguished.  Eminent domain pro-
vides relief when hold-outs are judged to be counter-productive. See Monongahela
Nav. Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 326–27 (1893); see also Sara Rimer, Some Seeing
Crimson at Harvard’s ‘Land Grab,’ N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 17, 1997, at A16, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/1997/06/17/us/some-seeing-crimson-at-harvard-land-grab.html.
90 Sipple v. Chronicle Publ’g Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 665 (Ct. App. 1984).
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for the framed copy of his letter from President Ford (which was post-
marked three days after the assassination attempt).91
Given Sipple’s accurate estimation that his family would react
very badly to news about his homosexuality, Sipple would have valued
a property right in his personal information highly.  But the utility of
the story to social welfare would likely be greater still.  This was, after
all, a culture-changing story.  Sipple was one of America’s first strong,
openly gay, heroic figures.92  A wide range of people may have bene-
fited from the Chronicle’s story—those whose perception of homosexu-
ality improved, those who valued knowing more about President
Ford’s potential prejudices, those in the gay community who exper-
ienced pride, or who faced a very slightly smaller amount of hostility
because of Oliver Sipple’s story.  The San Francisco Chronicle, too,
received reputational rewards for its newsgathering.93  These benefits
are unmeasurable and uncertain, but they receive considerable pre-
sumed weight.  At least, that is the reasoning behind the core belief
that “[f]reedom of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in
this nation, must embrace all issues about which information is
needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with
the exigencies of their period.”94
Under a property model, the San Francisco Chronicle would not
have bought the rights to Sipple’s personal information.  The story
would not have increased the prestige of the Chronicle enough to be
worth the high price tag.  Though the story was valuable to a wide
range of other people, a sale of the information license would have
required the coordination of an impossible network of transaction
and valuation costs.95  The fate of these facts was better off in the
hands of the Chronicle and the other journalists, even though this rule
sacrifices Sipple at the altar of social progress.
Sipple’s losses were quite weighty since he was a member of a
minority group that was heavily and irrationally stigmatized at the
time.96  Still, even under these very sympathetic circumstances, a right
91 Dan Morain, Private Lives, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1989, § 5, at 1, available at http:/
/articles.latimes.com/1989-02-13/news/vw-1568_1_gay-big-deal-jerry-ford.
92 RANDY SHILTS, THE MAYOR OF CASTRO STREET 122 (1982).
93 If not, providing Sipple with an entitlement of any sort (let alone a property
right) would not be economically efficient.  Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed,
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L.
REV. 1089, 1122 (1972).  Speculation about the value of personal information also
suffers from the problem of assessment costs.
94 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940).
95 KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 82, at 410. R
96 Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed warn against any analysis that favors
economic efficiency and treats all costs with equal weight without regard for other
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to hold out, or scrape back, information will frustrate attempts to seize
teachable moments and allow information to slowly winnow the mis-
impressions that caused so much grief in Sipple’s day. Sipple illus-
trates the general point that privacy losses are the negative
externalities from an otherwise productive and worthwhile activity—
information flow.
Information flow should be deterred through liability rules when,
and only when, the foreseeable privacy harms outweigh the benefits of
free-flowing facts.97  This is not to say that privacy must succumb to
information absolutism.98  Balances must be struck.  Tort law is opti-
mally suited to this task; property entitlements are not.
D. Personal Information Problems Are (Still) Tort Problems
The privacy law approach to information harms is misguided
because it prioritizes the autonomy and self-determinism of an infor-
mation subject over competing autonomy interests of the information-
holders and the societal interests in unencumbered information flow.
Very few rights are absolute, and our rights to privacy and to informa-
tion-access are not among them.  A defensible system of privacy must
analyze whether the social costs of free information flow outweigh the
considerations such as distributional effects and social justice.  Calabresi & Melamed,
supra note 93, at 1122.  Likewise, Kaplow and Shavell encourage models other than
equal distribution when aggregating utility, including Rawlsian models that might
weight the interests of the poor and underprivileged more heavily. KAPLOW &
SHAVELL, supra note 82, at 28–29 & n.27.
97 Low stakes scenarios lead us to the same result.  Suppose Hulu.com viewers
were able to exercise a property right and withhold consent to use their viewing his-
tory information for directed advertising (or for any purpose other than serving the
television shows they would like to watch).  In the best case scenario, the privacy-
seekers would absorb the costs of forcing the site to supply a different business
model—either in the form of having to watch more advertisements or by having to
pay to watch the Hulu content.  But since differentiating between viewers and creat-
ing different platforms imposes transaction costs on Hulu, it is more likely that Hulu
will keep a single platform and force all viewers to absorb the additional costs—in the
form of more advertisements, for example—that result from the privacy-seekers’ with-
held information.  The property interest creates a free rider problem.
98 Eugene Volokh makes the descriptive claim that a restriction on the flow of
personal information would not survive constitutional scrutiny even if the restriction
did maximize aggregate social utility.  Volokh, supra note 23, at 1076.  This may well R
be true, but this Article asks how information should be regulated.  As a practical mat-
ter, since the utility of privacy and speech cannot be measured, one could argue that
First Amendment strict scrutiny (requiring a compelling state need and tailoring) is a
utilitarian test—one that assumes a high value in speech and looks searchingly for
evidence of countervailing factors.
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expected benefits.99  Thus, an optimal collection of privacy regula-
tions will deter the sorts of information flows that tend to create more
disutility than utility.  This is exactly what common law tort rules
aspire to do.100
A tort treatment of information harms has the virtue of assessing
the new risks of personal data aggregation without committing to a
certain predetermined end state.  While privacy law scholars automati-
cally code all increases in personal data accumulation as a threat, tort
scholars are open-minded about the appropriate activity level, so long
as the activity is not posing undue risk.101  Thus, while privacy law
scholars want a particular end state—less data shared with fewer peo-
ple—tort law scholars are indifferent about the end state so long as
the law deters harmful and objectionable acts.
Privacy scholars have given up on tort in part because they have
become preoccupied with controlling the dissemination of data.  The
tort addressing personal information flows at this stage—the tort of
public disclosure of private facts—has been chiseled away by case
law.102  But in their haste to find a new means of controlling dissemi-
nation, privacy scholars have overlooked a tort that operates at the
stage of observation—the tort of intrusion.
By way of example, consider a hypothetical posed by Patricia
Sanchez Abril:
Fiona is gay but has not told her co-workers or professional
acquaintances.  George, one of Fiona’s co-workers, secretly obtains
her MySpace password so as to snoop around her profile.  On her
profile, he finds information that leads him to believe that she is
leading a gay lifestyle.  George instantly divulges this information to
99 This is the basic welfare economics model.  Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell,
Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 977 (2001).  Paul Ohm, too, uses a
utilitarian model and advises regulators to compare the risks of unfettered informa-
tion flow to its likely costs in privacy.  Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding
to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1768 (2010).  Note
that this model is flexible as to what types of “harm” are accounted.  Thus, it is not
necessary to come up with one unifying theory of what constitutes a privacy harm.  I
tend to agree with Daniel Solove that this is a futile task. DANIEL SOLOVE, UNDER-
STANDING PRIVACY ix (2008).
100 Risk-utility models were originally anticipated by Samuel Warren and Louis
Brandeis, whose groundbreaking article on privacy cautioned that privacy rights
should not interfere with access to valuable information.  Warren & Brandeis, supra
note 20, at 214–16.
101 Compare KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 82, at 85, with Litman, supra note 10, at R
1303, and Richards, supra note 10.
102 See, e.g., Richards, supra note 10, at 373–74.  As Richards points out, much of
this chiseling has been done for good reason in light of the speech interests impli-
cated by the tort.  For a full discussion, see infra Part IV.
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the rest of the office staff.  As a result, Fiona suffers a great amount
of stress and is ostracized by some of her colleagues.  Her work and
her career are subsequently jeopardized.103
Abril focuses on the fact that George divulges the information and
causes suffering to Fiona—suffering that is not recoverable under the
tort of public disclosure of private facts since Fiona’s sexual prefer-
ences are neither private facts nor highly offensive to a reasonable
person.104  To fix this injustice, Abril recommends a major overhaul of
the public disclosure tort, despite that tort’s inherent inconsistency
with free expression and unobstructed information flow.105
Abril overlooks the more compelling fact that George broke into
Fiona’s MySpace account.  This behavior fits quite comfortably within
existing routes of recovery under the tort of intrusion and intrusion-
style statutes.106  By casting Fiona’s cause of action as an uncontrover-
sial, straightforward application of the intrusion tort, Fiona’s recovery
will avoid what Anita Bernstein calls the “novelty paradox”—the reluc-
tance of courts to compensate new forms of injury precisely because
they are new.107  Moreover, the intrusion tort allows Fiona to recover
from George based not only on the injuries his disclosures caused, but
all the disclosures springing from it.  Just as trespassers are liable for
the full spectrum of damages they cause regardless of their inten-
tions,108 George will be liable for the mental distress caused by hack-
ing into Fiona’s account, for the distress caused by his releasing the
information to others, and for the distress caused by those others’
spreading the information further.
The tort of intrusion and its potential for expansion are explored
in the next two Parts.
103 Abril, supra note 46, at 39–40. R
104 Id. at 40.
105 Id.
106 George’s behavior is a criminal violation of the federal Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006).  A Michigan resident is facing a possible five year
sentence for using his wife’s password to log into her Gmail account, in violation of
Michigan state anti-hacking law.  Sara Wilson, Clara Walker: Leon Walker ‘Violated My
Privacy,’ HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 5, 2011, 4:14 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2011/01/05/clara-walker-leon-walker-_n_804924.html.
107 Anita Bernstein, How to Make a New Tort: Three Paradoxes, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1539,
1544–47 (1997).
108 See, e.g., Van Alstyne v. Rochester Tel. Corp., 296 N.Y.S. 726, 730–31 (App. Div.
1937) (imposing liability for the poisoning of two dogs when telephone company tres-
passed by leaving small bits of cable insulation containing lead, which were then con-
sumed by the dogs).
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II. OBSERVATION AND CAPTURE
We begin at the source of personal information flow by assessing
the harms caused by observation and information capture, and the
typical legal responses to them.  Observation and capture are tradi-
tionally analyzed together, as “data collection,”109 but observation and
capture raise distinct and interesting problems that can be profitably
explored by disentangling the two stages.  The recent spate of state
wiretap act prosecutions charging citizens who recorded their interac-
tions with police officers on cell phones110 shows the obvious tension
between observation and capture: if somebody is allowed to observe
something, why is he not allowed to make a record of it?  When do the
acts of observation and capture raise sufficiently different privacy
risks?  This Part begins by analyzing observation alone, and then con-
siders the nature of information harms caused by capture.
A. Observation
Suppose an obstetrician invites a friend to watch him perform a
childbirth. The expectant mother mistakenly assumes that the friend,
dressed in scrubs and introduced as a “helper,” is a medical student or
surgical assistant.111 The friend’s observation may have been quite val-
uable to him personally.  Perhaps it indirectly improved the world by
inspiring the friend to attend nursing school.  Nevertheless, the obser-
vation was tortious.
The tort of intrusion imposes liability on anybody who intention-
ally intrudes on the seclusion of another if the intrusion would be
“highly offensive to a reasonable person.”112  The intrusion tort pro-
tects an interest in respite from observation and judgment (when the
expectation of seclusion is reasonable).  A right to seclusion is justi-
fied by a number of theories: seclusion allows us to engage in “produc-
tive secrets”—surprises may be planned, plots may be concocted, and
109 Richards, supra note 13, at 1181–82. R
110 David Rittgers, Wiretap Law Needs Update, BALT. SUN, June 1, 2010, at A13, avail-
able at http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2010-06-01/news/bs-ed-maryland-wiretap-
ping-20100601_1_wiretapping-search-warrant-mr-graber; Heidi Reamer Anderson,
The Mythical Right to Obscurity: A Pragmatic Defense of No Privacy in Public, 7 ISJLP (forth-
coming 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=175
9374.
111 See De May v. Roberts, 9 N.W. 146 (Mich. 1881) (presenting the factual basis of
this example); see also Sanchez-Scott v. Alza Pharmaceuticals, 86 Cal. App. 4th 365
(2001), in which a pharmaceutical sales representative intruded on a patient’s seclu-
sion when he observed a breast examination because the patient’s consent to his pres-
ence was predicated on the false assurance that the sales representative was a doctor.
112 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
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new aspects of our individuality can be tried out without censure.113
Richard Posner promotes a right to seclusion on the theory that the
effectiveness of communications will diminish if we worry that unin-
vited intruders are listening in.114  Julie Cohen argues that zones of
limited access promote individuality and noncomformity.115  Seclu-
sion is where we groom ourselves, both literally and figuratively.  It’s
where a person can practice and fail in peace.  In the words of Ralph
Waldo Emerson, “[s]olitude, the safeguard of mediocrity, is to genius
the stern friend . . . .”116
The intrusion tort avoids conflict with information flows because
the psychic harms and chilling effects caused by intrusions are inde-
pendent from the production of new knowledge.  Though recogni-
tion of “seclusion” sometimes depends on the likelihood that sensitive
information could be generated, such as behind the drawn curtain in
a hospital emergency room or inside a hanging file marked “Private,”
strictly speaking an intrusion has nothing to do with the content of
the information that was discovered.  A voyeur who peers through the
windows and observes a mundane family scene has intruded upon the
family’s seclusion even though he has not learned any secrets.
Observation is a natural and necessary part of the human experi-
ence, so liability must be reserved for behavior that incorporates a suf-
ficient amount of intent and effort.  Intrusion guards our affairs from
the “prying eyes or ears of others.”117  It only offers a remedy when the
eyes and ears are prying—that is, when an intruder has notice of a
person’s reasonable expectation of seclusion and intentionally makes
an observation anyway.  An intrusion requires a deliberate investiga-
tion.  But by the same token, when a deliberate, obnoxious observa-
tion has taken place, liability is appropriate even in instances where
the information learned ends up being highly valuable or
newsworthy.118
Because the intrusion tort regulates behavior, its connection to
speech, news, and the free flow of information is tenuous enough to
113 Gavison, supra note 25, at 443; Joel R. Reidenberg & Francoise Gamet-Pol, The R
Fundamental Role of Privacy and Confidence in the Network, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 105
(1995) (arguing that privacy on the internet is necessary in order to promote trust
and exploration); Solove, supra note 32, at 553. R
114 Posner, supra note 84, at 408. R
115 Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52
STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1377 (2000).
116 RALPH WALDO EMERSON, CONDUCT OF LIFE 134 (1860).
117 Nader v. Gen. Motors Corp., 255 N.E.2d 765, 768 (N.Y. 1970).
118 Barber v. Time Inc., 159 S.W.2d 291 (Mo. 1942) (imposing liability and puni-
tive damages  on Time Magazine for taking and publishing a photograph of a patient
with a rare physical ailment after she explicitly denied consent).
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avoid conflict with the First Amendment.  Intrusion-style provisions in
federal statutes like the U.S. Wiretap Act119 (prohibiting the intercep-
tion of conversations), the Stored Communications Act120 (prohibit-
ing the unauthorized access of e-mail and other electronic
communications), and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act121
(prohibiting hacking into another’s computer accounts and personal
files) have avoided coming into conflict with the First Amendment
jurisprudence.
Intrusions are in the class of activities that tort law attempts to
deter completely.122  It is in the public’s interest to penalize intruders
even if the subject is unaware that he is being observed.  Indeed, many
intrusion-based laws (like the Wiretap Act) assign criminal liability for
intrusion, irrespective of the observed’s awareness that his seclusion
had been violated.  But given the heavy sanctions that can be applied
to intrusive acts, courts are under significant pressure to craft a defini-
tion of “seclusion” that serves the best interests of the community.
This is no easy task.
If seclusion is defined too narrowly, intrusion will be little more
than an extension of trespass law, protecting places only.  A narrow
version of seclusion might prevent parabolic microphones, binocu-
lars, and other sense-enhancing technologies that effectively transport
the intruder into the home, but this is little more than a conceptual
extension of a property line, and leaves out many contexts where the
observed might expect and profit from respite.
On the other hand, an expansive version of “seclusion” could
inappropriately constrain everyone else.  It could hamper our own
information-gathering practices that we instinctively rely on in order
to learn from the experiences of others.  Observation also plays an
important role in the class structure of American society.123  Unseemly
tabloid stories, so reviled by Warren and Brandeis, tear down the bar-
riers that separate elites from the rest.124  These barriers are com-
119 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2006).
120 Id. §§ 2710–2712.
121 Id. § 1030.
122 Like other intentional torts, intrusion aims to penalize anyone who evades the
information market and intentionally observes without permission.  Since the optimal
activity level for intentional torts is zero, we should embrace any enforcement and
deterrent that proves to be cost-effective. See POSNER, supra note 83, at 226–27. R
123 See generally Whitman, supra note 57 (explaining the difference between the R
American and European approaches to privacy).
124 Ryan Linkof elegantly makes this point in a recent op-ed in the New York Times.
Watching the painfully choreographed, and highly policed, red-carpet arrival of
Prince William and Kate Middleton at a recent Los Angeles polo match reminded me
why intrusive journalistic tactics are often called upon.  They exist to break down the
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posed of etiquette and social norms.  They are, in other words, made
from the same things that forge expectations of privacy and seclusion.
Courts face a dilemma when having to decide which of these norms of
etiquette to enshrine into the right of seclusion, and which to leave
unprotected by the rule of law.
The paparazzi scandals surrounding the death of Princess Diana
and the wiretapping scandals of Rupert Murdoch’s News of the World
tabloid are reminders that some acts of observation cross a line that
even news-lovers find unethical and repugnant.  On the other hand,
the aggressive newsgathering that helped break stories about the sex-
ual exploits of John Edwards and the investigative reporting tricks that
helped expose abusive medical facilities are reminders that nosiness
should be tolerated all the way up to that line.125  Thus, the definition
of seclusion must find a balance between the remoteness every human
legitimately counts on and the curiosity that every human legitimately
explores.
Difficult as it may be to elucidate the definition, courts have not
had too much trouble knowing seclusion when they see it.  A strip
search invades seclusion.126  Cameras mounted in holding cells at a
city jail do not.127  A public restroom provides seclusion most of the
time,128 but when a long masturbation session is interrupted by a
janitor with a duty to oversee the safety of the restrooms, there is no
violation of seclusion.129  A wife does not have seclusion from her hus-
band in their bedroom when her husband is there with her, but she
does have seclusion, even from her husband, when she is alone in the
same bedroom.130  The site of a bad automobile accident does not
barriers of access that keep social elites at a remove from ordinary people.  The tab-
loids, throughout history, on both sides of the Atlantic, have been predicated on chip-
ping away at that division.  They play a fundamental role in democratic cultures,
especially in societies characterized by the pull between the demands of a mass society
and the persistence of social and economic inequality.  Ryan Linkof, Op-Ed., Why We
Need the Tabloids, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2011, at A27, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2011/07/20/opinion/20linkof.html?_r=0.
125 Emily Miller, Op-Ed., John Edwards Indictment a Vindication for National Enquirer,
WASH. TIMES, June 3, 2011.http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/jun/3/
miller-john-edwards-indictment-vindication-nationa/.
126 Helton v. United States, 191 F. Supp. 2d 179 (D.D.C. 2002).
127 DeBlasio v. Pignoli, 918 A.2d 822, 825 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2007).
128 Kjerstad v. Ravellette Publ’ns, Inc., 517 N.W.2d 419, 422–23 (S.D. 1994).
129 Hougum v. Valley Mem’l Homes, 574 N.W.2d 812, 818 (N.D. 1998).
130 In re Marriage of Tigges, 758 N.W.2d 824, 827 (Iowa 2008).
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offer seclusion to the accident victims, but the inside of the rescue
helicopter does.131
Seclusion can be found in public spaces, as when a scorned lover
conducts constant surveillance from exclusively public places.132  But
courts require public surveillance to be unusually dogged before
assigning liability.133  As described in the Introduction, intentionally
leaning in to observe the money that Ralph Nader withdrew from his
account is an intrusion.  But if Nader kept his bills out and flaunted
them as he walked through the bank, then the same intentional obser-
vation (even if performed for malicious purposes) would not be intru-
sive.134  Seclusion cloaks our documents and affairs as well.  If a
person accesses a foe’s bank records or medical records through
fraud, he has intruded upon his foe’s seclusion.135
The distinction between the rights enforced by the intrusion tort
and the rights enforced by the broad-sweeping data privacy regula-
tions proposed by privacy scholars is not simply a difference between
tort and property.  Indeed, the line between property and intentional
torts is blurred.136  This is easiest to see with the tort of trespass, which
enforces property rights to exclusively control access to land and tan-
gible property.  Likewise, exclusive control over our seclusion is in
some sense a property-like entitlement that we are free to horde or
share as we please.  Countless Facebook posts have proven that we are
free to give away our seclusion if we do not value it highly.  When we
do maintain seclusion, our right to exclusive control over it is
enforced through the intrusion tort.  The main distinction between
intrusion and the other privacy proposals is the object of the exclusive
control.  With the latter, the object of exclusive control is information;
131 The quiet conversation between the accident victim and the doctor that came
to the scene is afforded seclusion, because the conversation might have been heard
only with the help of microphones.  Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469,
491 (Cal. 1998).
132 The Nader line of reasoning has been followed in other jurisdictions as well.
Kramer v. Downey, 680 S.W.2d 524 (Tex. App. 1984) (holding that incessant observa-
tion by a scorned ex-lover, even though she stayed on public property to do so, was an
intrusion upon seclusion justifying a jury damages award).
133 Id.
134 Nader v. Gen. Motors Corp., 255 N.E.2d 560, 570–71 (N.Y. 1970).
135 Zimmerman v. Wilson, 81 F.2d 847 (3d Cir. 1936); State ex rel. Clemens v.
Witthaus, 228 S.W.2d 4 (Mo. 1950) (en banc); Frey v. Dixon, 58 A.2d 86 (N.J. Ch.
1948); Bednarik v. Bednarik, 16 A.2d 80 (N.J. Ch. 1940); Brex v. Smith, 146 A. 34
(N.J. Ch. 1929).
136 WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT
LAW 30 (1987).
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with the former, it is not.  This is why intrusion coexists so comfortably
with other normative commitments.
The tort of intrusion reinforces norms by tracking social consen-
sus, which means that most people will recognize what is and is not
seclusion, even in new contexts.  This makes the tort especially flexi-
ble and appropriate for application to new technologies.  New applica-
tions of the tort will be discussed in Part III.  To make the discussion
fruitful, we next consider regulations of information capture.
B. Capture
The capture stage of personal information flow presents a num-
ber of puzzles.  Occasionally law forbids recording a person or event
even if observation of the event is legal.  These laws apply to mechani-
cal capture—photographs, videos, audio recordings, and other means
of capture that are sufficiently automated.
For example, some state wiretapping statutes contain an impor-
tant deviation from the federal analog, the Wiretap Act.  Federal law
penalizes anyone who intercepts a private conversation, but if one
party to the conversation chooses to record the conversation (or to
have some third party listen in and record it for them), that capture is
lawful.137  The Wiretap Act is a “one-party consent” statute: if one
party to the conversation consents to recording or interception, the
penalties do not apply.  Several states have enacted wiretap laws
imposing civil or criminal penalties unless all parties to a conversation
consent to the recording.  These statutes have sparked public debate
and criticism recently because citizens in Massachusetts, Illinois, Penn-
sylvania, and Maryland have been charged or prosecuted under the
wiretap statues for recording their own interactions with state police
officers.138  However well-intentioned legislators may have been when
the laws were adopted, the inexorable inference is that state police
forces are exploiting the laws to evade public accountability.139
Courts have not created First Amendment safeguards for the use
of recording devices.  Photographs, video capture, and audio record-
ings are often found to lack the authorship or expressive character
necessary to be considered speech,140 and recording equipment is not
137 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c) (2006).
138 Anderson, supra note 110. R
139 Id.
140 See Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 2010); Pomykacz v. Bor-
ough of W. Wildwood, 438 F. Supp. 2d 504, 513 n.14 (D.N.J. 2006) (“An argument
can be made that the act of photographing, in the abstract, is not sufficiently expres-
sive or communicative and therefore not within the scope of First Amendment pro-
tection—even when the subject of the photography is a public servant.” (citing
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among the “indispensable tools of newsgathering” that receive deriva-
tive protection under the First Amendment.141  The iPhone and the
citizen-blogger might make one question whether the law accurately
reflects today’s news media landscape.142  To take just one recent
example, a bystander’s photographs of Lt. John Pike pepper spraying
Occupy movement protesters on the U.C. Davis campus catapulted
the story into the national headlines and sparked a satirical Internet
meme wherein the Lieutenant appears in famous works of art, casually
pepper spraying the subjects.143  Recent case law has begun to recog-
nize a constitutional right to film public officials performing their offi-
cial duties.144  We may see this narrow right to capture expand in due
time.
Putting aside the First Amendment’s application, when does
mechanical capture alone, without observation, create serious risks?
In the uncommon instances where a plaintiff has sued for intrusion
Tenafly Eruv Ass’n, Inc. v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 160 (3d Cir. 2002))); C.
Thomas Dienes, Protecting Investigative Journalism, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1139, 1146
(1999).  Perhaps in light of Justice Kennedy’s reasoning in Sorrell v. IMS, the right to
mechanical capture can be tested again.  Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653,
2667 (2011) (“Facts, after all, are the beginning point for much of the speech that is
most essential to advance human knowledge and to conduct human affairs.  There is
thus a strong argument that prescriber-identifying information is speech for First
Amendment purposes.”).
141 Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 249 (9th Cir. 1971) (internal quotation
marks omitted); Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 495 (Cal. 1998)
(internal quotation marks omitted); Shevin v. Sunbeam Television Corp., 351 So. 2d
723, 727 (Fla. 1977).
142 Seth Kreimer makes a powerful case for First Amendment protection of image
capture.  Seth F. Kreimer, Pervasive Image Capture and the First Amendment: Memory, Dis-
course, and the Right to Record, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 335, 337 (2011).
143 Robin Wilkey, John Pike Memes Go Viral: Pepper-Spraying UC Davis Cop Becomes
Internet Sensation, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 21, 2011, 8:22 PM), http://www.huf-
fingtonpost.com/2011/11/21/john-pike-memes-go-viral_n_1106616.html.
144 See  Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 82 (1st Cir. 2011) (“Gathering information
about government officials in a form that can readily be disseminated to others serves
a cardinal First Amendment interest in protecting and promoting ‘the free discussion
of governmental affairs.’” (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966))).  The
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania recognized a First Amend-
ment right to videotape public officers performing their public duties.  Robinson v.
Fetterman, 378 F. Supp. 2d 534, 541 (E.D. Pa. 2005).  The Third Circuit declined to
follow Robinson when a recording was made during a traffic stop because these stops
are inherently dangerous for police, and because the recording was not clearly made
for a political or expressive purpose.  Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 262
(3d Cir. 2010); see also Pomykacz v. Borough of W. Wildwood, 438 F. Supp. 2d 504,
513 n.14 (D.N.J. 2006)  (“[V]ideotaping or photographing the police in the perform-
ance of their duties on public property may be a protected activity.” (emphasis added)
(quoting Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 212 n.14 (3d Cir. 2005))).
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based on capture alone, without alleging an offensive observation, the
act of capture implied that the information would, eventually, be used
for some lascivious or inappropriate purpose.  For example, the plain-
tiffs in Hamberger v. Eastman were tenants who discovered that their
landlord had installed hidden video cameras in the bedroom of their
apartment.145  The landlord attempted to evade liability for intrusion
by arguing that the plaintiffs could not prove he actually viewed the
video footage, but the court was not impressed with this argument.146
Suppose, though, that the landlord had installed the video cam-
era so that it monitored only the inside of the front door, and had a
practice of not reviewing the footage unless a crime or emergency
warranted it.  The outcome of the case under those alternative facts is
less certain.  The recordings that were actually made, though, were so
unlikely to be useful for any purpose other than the landlord’s recrea-
tion that the court was compelled to impose liability even without evi-
dence of an offensive observation.147
Law addressing capture on its own, untethered from observation,
is sparse, but two factors seem necessary.  First, the subjects must have
insufficient opportunity to prevent the intentional observation, and
second, the record must have no redeeming social value.  The facts of
Hamberger satisfy both of these elements, as do video voyeurism laws,
which prohibit surreptitious capture of other people’s “private areas”
irrespective of whether the images are ever observed.148
The Video Voyeurism Prevention Act imposes a penalty only if
the individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy, and her body
parts are captured surreptitiously, so the first element is met.149  The
second element is incorporated into the Act, too, because the Act pro-
hibits only recordings that are made with the intent to capture an
image of private areas.  If a hidden surveillance camera, installed for
the purposes of security, were to capture an image of a female breast
when a gust of wind flips up a shirt, this capture would not violate the
Act.  Footage created for the purpose of security provides significant
utility, even if it also incidentally captures the occasional private part.
Images intentionally capturing private areas do not tend to add signifi-
cant social value.150
145 Hamberger v. Eastman, 206 A.2d 239, 242 (N.H. 1964).
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 See, e.g., Video Voyeurism Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1801 (2006); ALA. CODE
§ 13A-11-32 (2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 810.145 (West 2012).
149 18 U.S.C. § 1801.
150 The tort of public disclosure of private facts has been used to effect a limitation
at the point of capture when a momentary accidental nudity was captured without
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Before the era of rapid data growth, observation took place
before, or concurrent with, capture.  Sally Mann observed her family
through the lens of her camera just before she captured them.151  And
Linda Tripp recorded her conversation with Monica Lewinsky as they
were having it.152  Today, information capture is a ubiquitous and
unavoidable part of ordinary modern life.  The geo-location data cre-
ated and transmitted by our cell phones, the routing information
logged by our Internet service providers, and even the data generated
by our hotel doors,153 are part of the data exhaust we produce simply
by going about our business.  While it might seem convenient to con-
sider all acts of capture to be acts of observation as well, doing so
would severely shrink the scope of seclusion.  The reason is a bit
counterintuitive: if we consider all captures of data to be observations,
then we would have to expect, and consent to, the observation of our
data anytime we use a technology that must produce a data trail to
function properly.  This would eliminate any possible expectations we
might have in seclusion to that data.
A critical insight for our purposes is that, except in the rare
instances described above, it is observation, and not capture, that is at
the heart of an intrusion.  By recognizing that intrusion protects us
from excessive and overzealous observations, we can distinguish
between innocuous data capture and inappropriate, focused investiga-
tion.  This permits courts to expand the intrusion tort amid the data
exhaust.
consent.  Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 162 So. 2d 474 (Ala. 1964). But see McNa-
mara v. Freedom Newspapers, Inc., 802 S.W.2d 901 (Tex. App. 1991) (finding that
the First Amendment provided immunity to a newspaper that published a photo-
graph of a high school soccer player whose genitalia were accidentally exposed).  The
exposure of nude body parts may be a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for
recovery based on images of people in sexually compromising positions. See Borton v.
Unisys Corp., 1991 WL 915, *9 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (where a photograph taken while an
employee cupped his hands over another employee’s breast without consent was not
depicting anything sufficiently “private” because none of the crucial body parts were
exposed).
151 Lyle Rexer, Marriage Under Glass: Intimate Exposures, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2000,
at AR1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2000/11/19/arts/art-architecture-mar-
riage-under-glass-intimate-exposures.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm.
152 The Prosecution of Linda Tripp, Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1999, at WK12,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/1999/12/19/opinion/the-prosecution-of-linda-
tripp.html.
153 Hotel door data was expected to play a role in the rape prosecution of Domi-
nique Strauss-Kahn, the Chief of the International Monetary Fund.  Angelique
Chrisafis & Ed Pilkington, Hearing is Likely to Hinge on the Question of Consent, GUARDIAN
(LONDON), May 19, 2011, at 23, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/
may/18/strauss-kahn-defence-likely-consent.
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III. THE NEW INTRUSION
In 2000, as privacy scholars began to convene, anticipate, and col-
lectively fret over the mounting privacy troubles in the age of the
Internet, Michael Froomkin suggested that the community might
have to consider whether modern data collection practices “constitute
an invasive tort of some type.”154  He recognized that, if privacy law
can address invasive collection techniques, that will relieve the need
for regulation to address problems downstream.155  This Part takes up
Froomkin’s challenge.  It will show how the intrusion tort can be clari-
fied and modernized to tackle the most troubling data collection
practices.156
A. Ubiquitous Data Exhaust
Recall the fictional General Motors spy from the Introduction
who followed Ralph Nader down every aisle of a store, taking note of
every product he examined or put, temporarily, into his cart, some-
how managing to collect all this information without being
detected.157  This crudely describes the type of information collected
by web tracking technologies like cookies and web bugs.  Websites are
not particularly unique in this regard; nearly all machines and gadgets
154 A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461, 1542 (2000).
Froomkin did not believe that existing tort laws, including intrusion upon seclusion,
could be expanded to meet privacy demands such as closed circuit television monitor-
ing because the tort traditionally excluded any surveillance or observations per-
formed in public spaces. Id at 1538–39.  He also believed expansion of the tort into
public spaces would directly conflict with the First Amendment, but the tort is in fact
in less tension with the right to free speech and access to information than the other
reforms Froomkin considers.  However, Froomkin and I are in agreement that the
creation of records in the course of a business transaction is immune from tort liabil-
ity, and therefore puts limits on the aggressiveness with which the intrusion tort may
defend and define privacy rights.
155 Id. at 1542.
156 For a more detailed description of the technology, see In re DoubleClick Inc.
Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 503–04 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
157 One military court opinion suggested that people cannot have a subjective
expectation of privacy in data files that they do not know exist.  “The military judge
concluded the appellant had no expectation of privacy in the contents of the com-
puter.  We find no abuse of discretion in his ruling.  There is no evidence the appel-
lant was aware the Internet history files existed, and we are unconvinced the appellant
could entertain a subjective expectation of privacy in them without such knowledge.”
United States v. Larson, 64 M.J. 559, 563 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2006).  This poor rea-
soning is probably an example of bad facts making bad law.  Since the defendant was
sanctioned for soliciting sex from somebody he believed to be a fourteen-year-old
(but was in fact a law enforcement officer), the court was motivated to make every
determination against him.
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produce data about their users for some functional purpose.  But
since web tracking incorporates most of the issues that arise from
other forms of data exhaust, an understanding of intrusion’s applica-
tion to website data provides an instructive template.
Suppose Arthur visits the website Pandora.com for the first time.
Pandora streams music based on bands that Arthur identifies as
“seeds.”  Arthur is able to listen to the customized radio station and
create an account for free; Pandora’s business model relies on adver-
tising, which is serviced by DoubleClick (now a subsidiary of
Google).158
When Arthur types pandora.com into his browser, his computer
sends packets of data through the network of networks that consti-
tutes the Internet until the packets reach their destination—Pan-
dora’s servers.  Pandora’s servers reconstruct the packets into the
request message (essentially, “I want to see your home page”).
Pandora automatically sends a response to Arthur’s computer
containing three elements.  First, the response includes the HTML or
Javascript code and other files like JPEGs of pictures so that Arthur’s
computer can build and display the webpage.  Now, Arthur’s com-
puter will have everything he needs to view the page except for the
advertisements.  Second, the response includes cookies and, perhaps,
action tags or web bugs, which are additional files stored on Arthur’s
computer that keep track of his online activities.  Third, the response
includes an IP address link that directs Arthur’s computer to commu-
nicate with DoubleClick’s server so DoubleClick can send the files
needed to fill in the ad space.  When that happens, DoubleClick
places its own cookie on Arthur’s computer, if he does not already
have a DoubleClick cookie.  (He probably does, in which case the IP
address link would also contain his unique DoubleClick cookie ID.)
DoubleClick will then send a targeted ad to Arthur.
The cookies—both Pandora’s and DoubleClick’s—record limited
categories of information, sometimes including the user’s passwords
and browsing histories.  But most crucially, the cookies contain a
unique ID string of characters which will enable the cookie-placing
entity to look up details collected from previous visits and stored on
their own servers.  For example, if Arthur had a preexisting Pandora
cookie, it may have recorded content that Arthur typed into his
browser to transmit to Pandora in past visits—his name and password,
or the names of the bands he used to seed his radio station, for exam-
ple.  Cookies can be used to look up any content once communicated
158 Matthew Lasar, The Perils of Being Pandora, ARS TECHNICA (Feb. 15, 2011),
http://arstechnica.com/media/news/2011/02/the-perils-of-pandora.ars.
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between the user and the website, so if a user has provided their
name, e-mail address, search terms, or credit card information to the
website they are visiting, the website and the third party intermediary
advertisers may have logged the information so that it could be associ-
ated later with the unique cookie ID.
Pandora can also store location information about the pages
Arthur visited within the Pandora website.  This may be of limited
interest in the context of an online radio station website, but location
information is more consequential when one considers a cookie
placed by WebMD (and the cookies of its third party advertising affili-
ates).  WebMD might record that Arthur’s computer visited the site’s
gonorrhea page.  Action tags (also known as “web bugs” or “clear
gifs”) work with cookies to record even more particularized informa-
tion, such as the user’s mouse movements across the website, and keys-
trokes that were entered into fields on the webpage but never actually
sent (because the user deleted the content or decided not to submit
the information).  The action tag is loaded directly onto the HTML
page as the user views it, though it is not visible, and it writes the
keystroke and mouse movement details onto the user’s cookie
profile.159
The creators of Web browsers (like Microsoft’s Explorer,
Mozilla’s Firefox, and Google’s Chrome) implement a number of
industry standards developed by the Internet Engineering Task Force.
The standards are referred to as Requests for Comments (“RFCs”) to
show the Task Force’s commitment to consensus, adaptation, and
non-stasis.  The RFCs specify that information recorded on one party’s
cookie must be encrypted, cannot be observed by others, and must
not contain malicious code (designed to inspect or tamper with the
computer user’s files).  Though the RFCs are technically industry self-
regulation and, in theory, a new browser could ignore the standards,
the RFCs have the force of network effects.  If a browser does not
implement one or more of the RFCs, it could have compatibility
problems with other servers and users on the Internet and fail to func-
tion properly.  Some of the RFCs are also supported by public law.  If a
third-party website or entity attempted to access a cookie without the
authorization of the computer user or the website that placed the
cookie, this act would presumably violate the Stored Communications
159 Stefanie Olsen, Nearly Undetectable Tracking Device Raises Concern, CNET (July 12,
2000, 3:05 PM), http://news.cnet.com/2100-1017-243077.html.  For a description of
current cookie-setting practices, see CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE ET AL., CAN ADVERTISERS
LEARN THAT “NO MEANS NO”?, BNA PRIVACY & SECURITY LAW REPORT (2011).
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Act.160  And if a cookie was programmed with malicious code
designed to vandalize the computer user’s files, the cookie would vio-
late the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.161
While web tracking technologies are capable of capturing granu-
lar detail about computer users, the details are often accessed to
improve visitors’ experiences.  These are benefits web users have
come to expect.  For example, the cookie can store the Arthur’s login
information and password, and it can recall which pages on the site
Arthur has viewed so that the hyperlinks appear in a different color.
Even mouse and keylogging data can be aggregated across a site’s
users and analyzed to assess whether the information architecture of
the site is causing confusion or inefficiency.
The cookie databases of third party intermediaries like
DoubleClick cannot claim to have the same aim of helping the user’s
experience, and they record the same types of details.  Moreover, they
capture data during the interactions the user has with all of the inter-
mediary’s affiliated websites.  Thus, DoubleClick’s cookie has far more
information about Arthur than Pandora’s cookie.  DoubleClick has all
of the information on Pandora’s cookie, as well as all the information
on Toys R Us’s cookie, as well as all the information on the New York
Times’ cookie, and so forth.  A quick session of websurfing could
increase the detail in the DoubleClick cookies significantly because of
DoubleClick’s aggregation of market power.  Neil Richards has char-
acterized these “über-databases” as inherently problematic.162  The
vast scale differences between what was once known about people and
what can be known about them today is also at the heart of Paul
Ohm’s critique of the accretion of information in our personal
“databases of ruin.”163  But it is not analytically rigorous to say that a
difference in scale is a difference in kind.  Without a coherent theory
of harm, accretion is merely a description of the information ecosys-
tem we live in today and not, necessarily, a threat.
160 The computer user and the website (or its advertising intermediaries) are
“users” under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, and the communications
recorded by the cookies are covered communications; thus, accessing the cookies
without consent would be an offense under 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) (2006). In re
DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 507–08.
161 The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act outlaws the intentional access of informa-
tion and causing damage to an end user’s computer.  18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(B),
(2)(C) (2006).
162 Richards, supra note 13, at 1158. R
163 Ohm, supra note 99, at 1762. R
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Offensive observations, on the other hand, are fully realized pri-
vacy harms as soon as they occur.  A legal challenge that focuses on
these harms has the most likelihood of success.
B. Failed Attempts
So far, every legal challenge to Web tracking has tried to force-fit
the facts into federal statutory schemes that were designed to prevent
something else.164  Attempts to recover using the Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act (CFAA) falter on the $5000 damages and economic
loss requirement—a threshold chosen by Congress to ensure that only
the most malicious incidents of hacking are ensnared by federal crimi-
nal and civil liability.165  Challenges based on the Wiretap Act fail
because the website tracking the user is a party to the communication.
Even the website’s third party intermediaries, such as DoubleClick, fall
outside the scope of the Wiretap Act because of the one-party consent
rule; so long as one party to the conversation consents to a recording
or interception, the statute’s prohibitions do not apply.166  Since Pan-
dora authorizes DoubleClick to access its communications with
Arthur, DoubleClick’s data capture has the same legal consequences
that Pandora’s does.167
The plaintiffs’ bar has not made a serious attempt to deter web
tracking through tort law.  State causes of action were alleged in major
web tracking cases like In re DoubleClick and Avenue A, but after the
federal courts dismissed the statutory claims and withdrew ancillary
164 In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litigation, 329 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2003); Chance v.
Avenue A, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1153 (W.D. Wash. 2001); In re DoubleClick, 154 F.
Supp. 2d at 497; Valdez v. Quantcast Corp., CV10-05484 (Cal. 2010).
165 Avenue A, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 1160; In re DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 522.
166 The Stored Communications Act exempts interceptions that are authorized
“(1) by the person or entity providing a wire or electronic communications service;
[or] (2) by a user of that service with respect to a communication of or intended for
that user.”  18 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(1)–(2) (2006).  The Wiretap Act states that “[i]t shall
not be unlawful under this chapter for a person not acting under color of law to
intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication where such person is a party to
the communication or where one of the parties to the communication has given prior
consent to such interception . . . .” Id. § 2511(2)(d); United States v. Caceres, 440
U.S. 741, 750 (1979) (confirming the Wiretap Act adopts the one-party consent rule).
The Wiretap Act does outlaw interceptions that are made for a tortious purpose,
regardless of whether a party has consented to the interception, but courts have dis-
tinguished between tortious purposes and tortious means.  The interception cannot be
the basis for relief under the “tortious purpose” clause.  Sussman v. Am. Broad. Co.,
186 F.3d 1200, 1202–03 (9th Cir. 1999).
167 Avenue A, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 1161; In re DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 510, 519.
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jurisdiction over the state claims,168 the cases evaporated.  The state
claims were never fully litigated—probably a reflection of the trial law-
yers’ confidence in the likelihood of winning based on a novel inter-
pretation of privacy torts.  Recent lawsuits against Google, Clearspring
Technologies, and Disney that challenge the use of flash cookies and
respawning cookies attempt to use the same ill-fitting federal statutes
rejected in DoubleClick and Pharmatrak and will probably duplicate
their fate.169
With a careful understanding of the intrusion tort, and the inter-
ests it is meant to protect, state courts are in the best position to
address the perils of web tracking.  Courts can identify circumstances
in which we should be able to expect seclusion while surfing the
World Wide Web, even if the web is considered to be public.  Next,
the Article describes how they should do so.
C. A New Intrusion
The intrusion tort is applicable to many contexts, but we will con-
tinue to use web tracking to explore its form and function, making
only the occasional detour to consider how the tort could work with
GPS data, security footage, and other personal data.
1. The Elements
Intrusion can benefit from some conceptual clarification before
it is applied to new contexts.  Even in real space, intrusion has only
two aspects to its design: there must be an observation, and that obser-
vation must be highly offensive to a reasonable person.170
A new restatement of the tort might look something like this:
168 Avenue A, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 1163.
169 Greg Sandoval, Suit Alleges Disney, Other Top Sites Spied on Users, CNET (August
14, 2010, 3:33 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-31001_3-20013672-261.html; Christo-
pher Sheean on the Latest Google Class Action, POINT OF LAW (December 8, 2010, 9:41
PM), http://www.pointoflaw.com/archives/2010/12/chris-sheean-on.php.
170 This is a collapsed version of the Second Restatement definition of intrusion
upon seclusion.  The Restatement defines the tortfeasor as: “[o]ne who intentionally
intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his
private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy,
if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.” RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).  Here, the observation event incorporates the inten-
tionality and the intrusion elements, and the requirement that the observation event
be offensive incorporates both the “offensiveness” element as well as considering
whether the plaintiff had “seclusion” in the first place.
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XXOne who intentionally observes another is subject to liability
to the other if the observation would be highly offensive to a reasona-
ble person.
As in real space, not every observation is offensive.  Information
that is voluntarily shared with an individual or the public can be
observed without offense by that individual, in the case of the former,
and by any individual in the case of the latter.  The offensiveness ele-
ment winds up turning on whether the observed could have and
should have expected their information to be exposed to the
observer.  If a piece of information was not voluntarily exposed, liabil-
ity will attach to any observation.
Identifying an “observation” is a surprisingly difficult and
uncharted task.  Recall that the creation and capture of data does not,
on its own, mean that observation has taken place.  In the classic intru-
sion cases, one human being observed another when they shouldn’t
have.  Today many challenging privacy problems have little to no
human involvement.
An observation requires personal information to be recognized in
some meaningful way.  If a human being reads a line of data about
somebody and comprehends its context, knowing whom the data is
describing, then the data is “observed.”  But we should not limit the
definition of observation to events involving human cognition.
Algorithmic and automated processes can violate a sense of seclusion,
too.  Suppose, for example, the website WebMD collects the IP
addresses of web users who visit its page on depression and automati-
cally submits them to a reverse-lookup service to obtain names and
mailing addresses.  Next, the WebMD program automatically trans-
mits the names and mailing addresses to a business affiliate which,
without allowing any employee to open the file, uses the data to fill
out a form letter reading, “Dear Mr. Smith, I understand you have
been coping with depression.  Our offices are here to help . . . .”  Busi-
ness practices are increasingly automated.  While human recognition
is sufficient to create an observation, it is not necessary.171  Thus, we
must determine for the first time what constitutes machine observa-
tion.  The results map quite neatly onto the Fair Information Practices
concept of purpose limitation.
The “offensiveness” and “observation” elements are explored in
more detail below.  This constitutes a first attempt to mark rough
boundaries for each of the two elements.  Given the significance of
171 M. Ryan Calo has stressed the importance of defining privacy without refer-
ence to a human observation.  Calo, supra note 22, at 1134 (“Privacy harm can and R
does occur in the absence of a human perpetrator.”).
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the legal rights protected by a new intrusion and the competing inter-
ests in information, the framework sketched out here leaves open the
exact definitions of “offensiveness” and “observation”.  These will be
fertile areas for future research.
We start with “offensiveness” because, although it might seem
ancillary to the observation element, it actually provides a helpful pre-
requisite sorting mechanism.  We need not worry about what it means
to observe data if the data has been voluntarily exposed.  The function
of the right to seclusion, as Part I has described, is to hash out a com-
promise between an individual’s interests in privacy and others’ inter-
ests in information.  The contours of our right to seclusion are
determined by the “offensiveness” element.  Observations penetrate
that seclusion.
a. Offensive Observations of Unexposed Data
During the consideration of an intrusion claim, juries and
lawmakers will have to decide whether the defendant’s observation is
sufficiently offensive to trigger liability.  Put another way, the fact-
finder must decide whether a computer user was justified in expecting
seclusion.  This requires the fact-finder to determine whether an
observation would interfere with solitary exercises that are important
to personal development and self-determination.
Some observations have long been treated as per se inoffensive,
and there is no reason to believe the case law should be reversed.
Transaction data created in the course of a purchase, for example, is
precisely the sort of information the user has willingly exposed to the
entity in order to purchase goods or services.172  Likewise, most com-
munications of content made by a computer user in order to interact
with a company are willing exposures.173  If Arthur tells Pandora that
he wants to hear Astrud Gilberto, it would not strike ordinary jurors as
offensive that Pandora knows, and remembers, that he requested Pan-
dora to serve up bossa nova music.  The analogy to the brick and mor-
tar world is instructive.  A skilled waiter remembers the preferences
172 In re Northwest Airlines Privacy Litig., 2004 WL 1278459, at *5 (D. Minn. 2004)
(finding that the plaintiffs’ intrusion claim failed because “[i]n this instance, Plaintiffs
voluntarily provided their personal information to Northwest”); Dwyer v. Am. Express
Co., 652 N.E.2d 1351, 1354 (Ill. App. 1995) (“By using the American Express card, a
cardholder is voluntarily, and necessarily, giving information to defendants . . . .”).
173 Searches within a site, while technically communications between the com-
puter user and the website, might be treated differently from other types of communi-
cations.  These searches might be distinguished from transactions with the website
because they are a means of orientation only, and not part of the quid pro quo of a
purchase.
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and ordering habits of regular customers.  Since organizations rou-
tinely maintain business records, it is not particularly disconcerting
that a company can access information voluntarily submitted by the
user in the course of obvious interaction.  For these types of transac-
tion data, restrictions on future dissemination and use would have to
be justified on some other ground.174
This is not to say that transaction data is a total free-for-all.  A
third party can still intrude on the transaction data if he has accessed
the data without permission from either the user or the transaction
company; a hacker is no different from the snoop who peeks at a per-
son’s medical records without permission from the patient or the
health provider.175  But the website itself can observe with impunity
the transaction records it maintains.
What about the detailed web tracking data?  Has a visitor volunta-
rily exposed the precise HTML pages accessed within the domain, or
the search terms used to find a page within the domain, or the items
browsed in an online store, or the movements of a user’s mouse?  Ulti-
mately, the answers will require juries or lawmakers to forge a rule
based on expectations that are reasonable in context.  The specific
expectations of a particular plaintiff are not determinative; after all,
hidden security cameras are designed to thwart expectations of sur-
veillance, but they are not, categorically, offensive when the observed
is in a so-called public space.176  The “public” is a social construction,
but it is one on which intrusion law has rested.
A number of factors could persuade a fact-finder or rule-maker
that web tracking cookie data has been exposed to the websites.
Americans might have a sophisticated understanding about the reve-
nue models for free web content and may not want to disturb them by
recognizing a right to seclusion that conflicts with Internet usage, or
they might affirmatively prefer tailored advertising.  But it is plausible
if not probable that rule-makers charged with the task of delineating
the boundary between private and public spheres would agree that,
without explicit consent, observations of detailed web tracking are
overzealous and exploitative.
174 Dissemination and use restrictions are discussed in the next Part. See infra Part
IV.  Uses of legitimately observed information that seem obnoxious, such as price
discrimination or employment screens, can be prohibited through tailored use
restrictions.
175 See supra note 135 for intrusion cases based on unauthorized access to records. R
176 Cameras installed in a restroom, or used to take up-skirt photographs, would
be another matter. See, e.g., Video Voyeurism Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1801
(2006); Speer v. Ohio Dept. Rehab. & Corr., 624 N.E.2d 251 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993).
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Illustration 1. Carol purchases a book on Amazon.  Amazon records
the date and time of Carol’s transaction, the items Carol purchased,
and Carol’s method of payment. Carol’s purchase information has
been exposed.  Amazon’s observation of this data cannot be
offensive.
Illustration 2.  Ben browses a few books on Amazon but decides not
to purchase anything.  Amazon records the identities of the prod-
ucts that Ben has browsed. Ben’s browsing information has not
been exposed.  Amazon’s observation of this data will be offensive.
The approach set forward here aligns the definition of seclusion
with the larger goals of privacy.  Sometimes this comes at the cost of
abstraction.  It requires us to draw distinctions between actions that
are not very different technologically.  The distinction between data
transmitted in the course of a purchase with Amazon and data trans-
mitted when the visitor loads a page for nose hair trimmers makes
little difference in terms of the HTTP messages exchanged between
the user’s computer and Amazon’s servers, but the conceptual distinc-
tion is great.
The New Intrusion’s non-technical approach to defining seclu-
sion is more of a strength than a limitation.  The Internet has caused
doctrinal quagmires in other areas of the law—is content stored in a
computer’s Random Access Memory (RAM) considered a “copy” for
the purposes of copyright infringement?  And do the contents of e-
mails, which technically are revealed to Internet service providers, fall
within the third party doctrine exception to the Fourth Amendment?
In both cases, the most recent, better reasoned approaches have
treated RAM copies as something other than a “copy,”177 and the body
of an e-mail as private, unexposed “inside the envelope” information,
even though these treatments are divorced from the technical reali-
ties.  The New Intrusion can be similarly pragmatic.  Because we are
more interested in how the Web seems to work than how it actually
works, judges and juries are in a good position to decide what sorts of
seclusion we instinctively expect to have while browsing the web or
using our gadgets.
Seclusion is only half the story.  Nothing prevents a website from
collecting unexposed tracking data; indeed, Hypertext Transfer Pro-
tocol (HTTP) code must be transmitted to a website in order to load a
particular page; although the data privacy literature often refers to
“data collection,” this collection is more accurately a failure to
expunge data.  The motive for separating the concepts of observation
177 Aaron Perzanowski, Fixing RAM Copies, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1067, 1083–84
(2010).
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and capture was to allow websites and technology to use captured data
to function more efficiently.  High functionality often requires auto-
mated processing of historical data.  But a device-user who has not
voluntarily exposed her data should be able to expect that her data
will not be observed.
b. Observation in the Digital Age
What is an observation?  When do we feel we are being studied?
Human recognition of a person’s data is a sufficient condition, but as
the Web MD auto-generated letter example shows, it is not necessary
one.
A natural starting point is to designate all data access as observa-
tion.  While conceptually clean, this definition quickly leads to a dead
end.  Data is generated in the first place to be accessed for some pur-
pose.  A Web user’s request to a website’s server to deliver an HTML
page must be accessed in order to deliver it.  Likewise, an HTML page
might use code that instructs a computer user’s web browser to access
data on his cookie in order to display the page properly—e.g. to load
the user’s previously customized display.  If this sort of access is deter-
mined to be an observation, there is no material distinction between
observation and capture.  To have any meaning at all, observation
must be distinct from the data processing that is intrinsic to the brows-
ing experience or functioning of a device.  The next illustration pro-
vides an example outside the webtracking context.
Illustration 3.  Vicki’s GPS device, manufactured and serviced by
TomTom, automatically stores and analyzes Vicki’s location data,
and is programmed to periodically recalculate her estimated time of
arrival based on the location logs. TomTom has not observed
Vicki’s location data.
Websites also access personal data in order to aggregate and ana-
lyze it for general trends.  Analytics are used to build predictive mod-
els about a generalized population and to analyze and refine the
functionality of a website.  When poor information architecture leads
a sizeable percentage of a website’s visitors to click on the wrong link,
the backtracking leaves an impression in the aggregated data.
There are cogent reasons to treat the pooling and processing of
data as a non-observation, so long as the data is processed without
overt reference to the data subject.178  First, since the data is used
without reference to the data subject, to the extent there is observa-
178 That is, processed without direct identifying information such as name,
address, or full IP address.  If the aggregated data is going to be shared for research
purposes it will need to undergo additional scrubbing to ensure that reidentification
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-1\NDL105.txt unknown Seq: 46  8-NOV-12 9:47
250 notre dame law review [vol. 88:1
tion at all it is of a fact unleashed from its generator, like footprints in
the snow.  If the anonymized data are related back to the original
device-user at some later point, the analytic exemption would expire.
But so long as data is used without interaction with, or knowledge of,
the particular data subjects, the subjects have not been observed.179
Second, the vast new accumulations of data can be extremely use-
ful for research purposes.  We are only just beginning to understand
the value of these grand new sources of information.  Researchers at
MIT, the London School of Economics, and Harvard have used cell
phone data to track mental illness, political discourse, obesity, happi-
ness, and stock market fluctuations.180  And GPS data can be used to
improve traffic planning and to monitor congestion in real time, so
that drivers can avoid delays.181  For these purposes—whether they
of a subject is not too easy to do. See Ohm, supra note 99, at 1744–48; Jane Yakowitz, R
Tragedy of the Data Commons, 25 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 1, 3–4 (2011).
179 Privacy advocates, the advertising industry, and the Federal Trade Commission
are locked in debate over whether an IP address, or the information contained in a
cookie, is “personally identifiable information.” FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING
CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES
AND POLICYMAKERS 18 (2012), available at http://ftc.gov/os/2012/03/120326privacy
report.pdf.  The New Intrusion sidesteps this debate because, once a party accesses a
cookie in order to communicate or interact with the end user for a purpose collateral
or in tension with the original purpose for which it was generated, it is irrelevant that
the advertiser does not know the name of the user, or does not know the user in a
meaningful way.  This is consistent with the goals that underlie the intrusion tort;
since intrusion protects a person’s seclusion from observation, it makes no difference
whether a peeping tom actually knows the person he observes.  It is the act of observ-
ing that violates the rights of the observed.
180 Robert Lee Hotz, The Really Smart Phone, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 22, 2011, 7:34 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704547604576263261679848814.
html?KEYWORDS=%22The+Really+Smart+Phone%22 (“[Cellphone] data can reveal
subtle symptoms of mental illness, foretell movements in the Dow Jones Industrial
Average, and chart the spread of political ideas as they move through a community
. . . .”).
181 Thus far, GPS studies have relied on vehicles carrying GPS logging devices with
the intent that the data would be analyzed by the municipality or city conducting the
studies.  But the studies are enormously useful for studying travel time and delays, for
assessing the effects (in traffic time) of construction or route alterations, and for eval-
uating whether traffic signals are timed correctly.  These types of studies could
become inexpensive and widespread standard practices for all jurisdictions if
researchers are able to access the log data of commercial GPS providers. See GEOS-
TATS, TravTime, http://www.geostats.com/product_trav.htm (last visited Oct. 11,
2012) (discussing the use of GPS to collect, analyze, and report traffic data).  How-
ever, aggregated data is used for law enforcement purposes, such as to help deter-
mine where to establish speed traps.  Such use is often perceived as violating the
privacy of the GPS device-users.  Tim Stevens, TomTom User Data Sold to Dutch Police,
Used to Determine Ideal Locations for Speed Traps, ENGADGET (Apr. 27, 2011, 1:53 PM),
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are as mundane as improving a website or as profound as understand-
ing the determinants of happiness—researchers do not care who is in
the database and who is not.  Statistical analysis strikes a very safe bal-
ance, enriching the accumulation of knowledge and the proverbial
marketplace of ideas without posing risk of repercussion or misuse to
the individuals described in the data.  But the data has to be processed
in order to anonymize and prepare the data for research use.182  The
New Intrusion can be aligned with societal interests by exempting
processing from the definition of observation, much like the Euro-
pean Union exempts processing for statistical research from the pur-
pose limitations of the Data Protection Directive.183
Illustration 4.  Verizon pools together its subscribers’ cell tower data
to analyze which geographic areas require the construction of addi-
tional towers.  Verizon has not observed the subscribers’ tower data.
Illustration 5.  Alexander regularly views television shows on Hulu.
Hulu gathers viewer usage data and anonymizes it in preparation
for release to researchers. Hulu has not observed Alexander’s tele-
viewing habits.
Having carved out the more obvious exceptions, the harder ques-
tion remains: what does count as an algorithmic observation?  It is
worth reflecting for a moment on the objectives of the right to seclu-
http://www.engadget.com/2011/04/27/tomtom-user-data-sold-to-danish-police-
used-to-determine-ideal (discussing how the Dutch police force is using TomTom nav-
igation devices to determine where speed traps and cameras should be placed).  It is
possible that the issue underlying the privacy concerns is that law enforcement might
have the wrong motivation in establishing speed traps.  Data-assisted speed traps
might do more to increase revenues and citation rates than they do to improve traffic
safety.  In that case, a person might feel tricked for his or her unwitting contribution
to the dataset that enabled the police to create the speed trap.  There are categories
of government data uses that can be carefully cabined or prohibited altogether
through use restrictions, but the capture of anonymized GPS data is not inherently
harmful.
182 If an entity with access to personal data exhaust wishes to analyze it in aggre-
gated form (and without any future reference back to the data subjects), it is suffi-
cient to strip direct identifiers such as names, IP addresses, contact information, and
credit card numbers.  If the entity wishes to share the data for research purposes to
third parties, the data will need to go through additional anonymization procedures,
or must be disseminated only through restricted licensing agreements. See Yakowitz,
supra note 178, at 6–8. R
183 “Further processing of data for historical, statistical or scientific purposes shall
not be considered as incompatible provided that Member States provide appropriate
safeguards.”  Council Directive 95/46, art. 6(1)(b), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 40 (EU).  Note,
though, that the required “safeguards” demand that the data pose no risk of reiden-
tification—a standard that is impossible to meet—and forces data holders to choose
between risking sanction or halting standard practices. Id. art. 13(2).
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sion.  Seclusion gives people the breathing space to be and to act with-
out having to worry about social or economic consequences.  Data
accessed for some purpose that is different and inconsistent with the
product or service for which the data was generated will generate
many of the same justified anxieties over the dissemination and poten-
tial implications as an intrusive observation.  The user can no longer
feel alone with his device.
For unexposed data—data for which a user maintains a right to
seclusion—the goals and designs of the Fair Information Practices are
quite apt.  When the personal data is used or disclosed for some pur-
pose inconsistent with its original collection without advance notice
and consent, an observation has occurred.  This definition of auto-
mated observation is nearly identical to the “respect for context”
incorporated into President Obama’s proposed Consumer Privacy Bill
of Rights.184
Context, or “purpose,” is not self-defining.  At the very least it
would include uses collateral to the service the user had accessed that
have the potential to significantly disadvantage the user.  The next
illustrations provide examples of such uses.
Illustration 6.  Anthony visits Amazon.com in order to purchase a
book after reading a review on a blog.  Research shows that custom-
ers who linked into Amazon from another website reviewing a prod-
uct are less likely to perform price comparisons before making a
purchase.  Amazon uses a pricing algorithm that automatically
offers Anthony a price $1.00 higher than the standard price based
on his link-in data. Amazon has observed Anthony’s link-in data.
Illustration 7.  (Based on the same facts as Illustration 6.)  Amazon
uses link-in and web-tracking data to construct a creditworthiness
index. Amazon has observed Anthony’s link-in and web-tracking
data.
Illustration 8.  (Based on the same facts as Illustration 6.) Amazon
discloses the link-in and web-tracking data to a third party data
aggregator that uses the data to construct, among other things,
interest profiles and employability indices. Amazon has observed
Anthony’s link-in and web-tracking data.
184 “Respect for Context” is defined as so: “[c]onsumers have a right to expect that
organizations will collect, use, and disclose personal data in ways that are consistent
with the context in which consumers provide the data.”  Press Release, The White
House, Office of the Press Sec’y, We Can’t Wait: Obama Administration Unveils
Blueprint for a “Privacy Bill of  Rights” to Protect Consumers Online (Feb. 23, 2012),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/02/23/we-can-t-wait-obama-
administration-unveils-blueprint-privacy-bill-rights.
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The New Intrusion framework intersects with Fourth Amend-
ment law in at least one important way.  The expansive third party
doctrine, which allows law enforcement officers to access business
records without obtaining a warrant, is premised on the assumption
that business records contain information that the suspect “voluntarily
turns over to third parties.”185  Personal data that has not been
exposed, and which cannot be observed by a company without trigger-
ing intrusion liability, has no logical place in the third party doctrine
exception to the search warrant requirement.186
Less obvious, however, is the New Intrusion’s implication on
behavioral advertising.  Given the current, dominant business model
for the most popular web services and online content providers, adver-
tising is arguably intrinsic to the purposes for which web tracking data
is created.  If the raison d’être for Facebook, Hulu, Google, and other
popular websites is to attract visitors by creative (and expensive) con-
tent in exchange for the display of advertising, advertising is a key,
obvious component of the web service.  Along this line of reasoning,
the use of data to facilitate advertising would not be inconsistent with
the purpose for which the data was created in the first place.  This may
be especially defensible in cases like Gmail targeted advertising, where
the scanning of the body of one’s email, and the prominent display of
all the free storage and service provision the user gets in exchange for
the advertising program, provides clear visceral notice of Google’s
practice of scanning contents to deliver ads.187
On the other hand, tracking practices extend well outside a user’s
experience with each particular website because of the frequent use of
third party cookies.  A user’s visit to website A on day one is arguably
wholly unrelated to the advertisement he is served on website B on day
30.  There is no definitive classification for behavioral marketing as an
observation.  Much will depend on whether one views advertising as
the Internet’s backbone or as its parasite.188
185 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979).
186 The more lenient warrant requirements adopted in the Stored Communica-
tions Act (SCA) that apply to routing data do not require probable cause.  18 U.S.C.
§ 2703(d) (2006).  If web-tracking data is “unexposed” and deserving of full Fourth
Amendment protection, the procedural protections of the SCA will not be constitu-
tionally sufficient.
187 For a description of visceral notice, see M. Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism,
in Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1027, 1034–35 (2012).
188 I do not wish to speculate about social norms with respect to behavioral adver-
tising since the empirical evidence is so mixed.  Survey after survey confirms that,
considered in isolation, Americans want to surf the Internet without creating a record
of their transactions and activities.  One study reports that ninety-two percent of
Americans believe there should be a law requiring “websites and advertising compa-
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2. Consent
Intrusion rules can always be modified through private agree-
ments.  Today private industry places considerable faith in their pri-
vacy policies and End User Licensing Agreements (“EULAs”) to
define the scope of their duties.  Boilerplate formalities of this sort
might suffice to limit the scope of contract liability, but they are not
sufficient to constitute consent to conduct that would otherwise be
tortious.  Consent is not assent.  Consent requires acts that manifest
an objective expectation that the would-be tort victim is willing for the
tortious conduct to occur.189  Qualitative research conducted by Chris
Hoofnagle and Jennifer King indicates that web users rarely have
nies to delete all stored information about an individual, if requested to do so.”
Joseph Turow et al., Americans Reject Tailored Advertising and Three Activities That Enable
It, 3 (2009), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1478214; see also Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorie
F. Cranor, Americans’ Attitudes About Internet Behavioral Advertising Practices, WPES ’10:
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 9TH ANNUAL ACM WORKSHOP ON PRIVACY IN THE ELECTRONIC
SOCIETY 63 (2010), available at http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1866929.  However,
these studies repeat a flaw that undermines the credibility of the findings: they do not
ask respondents whether they would prefer an alternative reality where the same
online content contains about twice the amount of (non-targeted) advertising, or
where they pay for content.  The handful of studies that do force survey respondents
to state their preferences in the context of privacy tradeoffs find that a majority of
Internet-users prefer free content with targeted ads over other types of privacy-pro-
tecting options like pay walls or increased quantity of advertising, though some of
these studies too have methodological flaws. KARL W. LENDENMANN, PREFERENCECEN-
TRAL, CONSUMER PERSPECTIVES ON ONLINE ADVERTISING—2010, at 2–3, 11 (2010),
available at http://www.slideshare.net/mfredactie/preference-central-surveyfull
report.  Note that the phrasing of the question, and the ordering of the answer
options, are objectionable.  The survey does not offer respondents the option to view
the same content with more advertising; the closest is an option for “somewhat limited
online information or less functional services.” Id.; see also Jacqui Cheng, 53% of
Mobile Users Happy to Hand Over Location Data For Discounts, ARS TECHNICA (Aug. 17,
2011, 1:25 PM), http://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2011/08/53-of-mobile-users-happy-
to-hand-over-location-data-for-coupons (“[M]ore than half of all consumers are will-
ing to exchange their mobile location data for content that is relevant to them at the
moment . . . .”); David Hallerman, Behavioral Targeting Attitudes, EMARKETER (July 29,
2008), http://www.emarketer.com/Article.aspx?1006456&R=1006456 (finding that
fifty-five percent of respondents are “very” or “somewhat” comfortable with behavioral
advertising).
189 See Litman, supra note 10, at 1311; John H. Mansfield, Informed Choice in the R
Law of Torts, 22 LA. L. REV. 17, 31 (1961) (“Consent is the right term to use when the
plaintiff was willing that a certain event occur, probably some conduct on the part of
the defendant, because he desired an invasion of a normally protected interest.”).
However, in light of the recent Supreme Court holding in Concepcion, websites might
enjoy de facto immunity from intrusion claims by requiring all visitors to arbitrate
their claims individually.  AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753
(2011).
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actual notice of a website’s policies; in fact, the mere existence of a
privacy policy prompts web users to assume, inaccurately, that the
website promises not to re-use or share its transaction data.190  Notices
and agreements that expand the scope of observation beyond what
courts would otherwise consider to be appropriate leave open a num-
ber of important questions.  Are there circumstances in which the
courts should demand heightened forms of notice for intrusive obser-
vations?191  Are there circumstances in which, for public policy rea-
sons, courts should not recognize consent at all?192  This Article
reserves for future research consideration of what form of notice is
sufficient to convert an intentional tort into a consented activity.193
However, standard privacy policies and user agreements may
interact with New Intrusion liability.  When an entity makes promises
that data will not be tracked or maintained, these promises can define
the contours of a user’s objectively reasonable expectations of seclu-
sion.  Thus, if a website observes data that it claims is not even being
captured, the observation will violate an expectation of seclusion cre-
ated by the website itself.194
In the past, lawsuits alleging that a website violates its own privacy
policies have proceeded under contract theory.  Because the resulting
contract damages are speculative, the lawsuits have been unsuccess-
ful.195  A claim for intentional intrusion upon seclusion could better
deter privacy policy gaming because plaintiffs would have access to
tort damages based on emotional distress and punitive damages, or
190 Chris Jay Hoofnagle & Jennifer King, What Californians Understand About
Privacy Online (Sept. 3, 2008) (unpublished article), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1262130.
191 Groundwork for these questions has already been laid by Andrea Matwyshyn.
Andrea Matwyshyn, Technoconsen(t)sus, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 529, 551–54 (2008).
192 For example, should job applicants be able to consent to observed urinalysis
drug testing when applying for jobs for which drug use is not particularly predictive of
incompetent or unsafe performance?
193 Christine Jolls has begun this very inquiry.  Christine Jolls, Rationality and Con-
sent in Privacy Law, (Dec. 10, 2010) (unpublished article), available at http://www.
law.yale.edu/faculty/CJolls.htm.
194 For example, the privacy policy for AudienceScience claims that the site will
replace any cookie of a user who opts out of information-collection with a new cookie
instructing the website to stop collecting information.  What actually happens, accord-
ing to Stanford researchers, is that AudienceScience keeps a highly unique cookie in
place that tracks the user’s interests, and continues to add information to this interest
cookie.  Jonathan Mayer, Tracking the Trackers: Early Results, STANFORD CENTER FOR
INTERNET & SOCIETY (July 12, 2011, 12:12 AM), http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/node/
6694.
195 In re JetBlue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d 299, 330 (E.D.N.Y.
2005); Dyer v. Northwest Airlines Corp., 334 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1200 (D.N.D. 2004).
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even nominal damages multiplied by large numbers of class
members.196
3. The Gap Between Tort Theory and Application
A primary goal of tort law—and especially the law of intentional
torts—is to deter socially repugnant behavior.  Since privacy claims
are based on psychic harms and emotional distress, compensatory
damages and even exemplary damages rely on evidence that distress
has, indeed, occurred.197  In theory, courts should allow juries to com-
pensate plaintiffs generously based on any credible evidence of dis-
tress in order to supply the basis for punitive damages, and in order to
effect deterrence.  Far from being an amorphous approach to the law,
compensation for emotional distress in instances of intentional, offen-
sive behavior is soundly within the canonical law and economics vision
of tort law.  The harms, though they are noneconomic and difficult to
count, easily outweigh the negligible benefits of the intentional, offen-
sive conduct.  But many scholars have noted judges’ skepticism when
overseeing cases based on psychic injuries.198  This Article does not
attempt to explore or resolve the gap between tort theory and its
application in the courtroom, but the hesitancy of the plaintiffs’ bar
to bring novel privacy cases, and the jurists to allow them to proceed
to the jury, must be acknowledged.199
However, there are reasons to be guardedly optimistic that courts
might embrace the New Intrusion as a conservative response to a
mounting problem.  Intrusion liability rules will create much-needed
clarity of law and policy, allowing businesses to use cookies without
risk so long as they stay within the bounds of per se objectively reason-
able observation.  Companies would not have to provide opt-out pro-
cedures or a “do not track” cookie, though they might choose to do so
196 In the context of trespass, which has a number of theoretical similarities to
intrusion, courts have allowed plaintiffs to recover punitive damages even though the
plaintiff suffered only nominal damage from the trespassing act. See Feld v. Feld, 783
F. Supp. 2d 76, 78 (D.D.C. 2011).
197 Alternatively, even nominal damage spread over a large enough class—such as
the class of Californians with DoubleClick cookies on their computers—would expose
web trackers to significant liability.
198 Citron, supra note 10, at 1809; Danielle Keats Citron, Law’s Expressive Value in R
Combating Cyber Gender Harassment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 373, 393 (2009).
199 Another potential impediment is the recent U.S. Supreme Court case AT&T
Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011), which held that class action waivers in
standard-form contracts are enforceable. Id. at 1753.  The parameters of that holding
are still quite unclear. See Myrium Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litiga-
tion in the Wake of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 639–40
(2012).
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to respond to market pressures.200  Intrusion law would put an end to
many problematic practices without forcing online businesses to sig-
nificantly alter their websites, and without undermining the revenue
model that currently supports much of the free online content.  The
intrusion approach is also readily enforceable because, by definition,
the tort applies only to offensive behavior.  Thus intrusion avoids the
problems facing European privacy enforcement agencies, which are
forced to choose between ignoring blatant violations of the EU cook-
ies laws by nearly every website (including those of most EU govern-
ments) or cracking down arbitrarily.201  Finally, if the common law
can deter offensive observation of personal data, lawmakers will not
have to consider restricting downstream dissemination and use of data
which, for reasons articulated in the next Part, will be more difficult.
IV. PRIVACY AFTER OBSERVATION: DISSEMINATION AND USE
Once information is collected through legitimate means, policy-
makers face an uphill climb to justify the regulation of its dissemina-
tion.  Laws restricting the disclosure or reuse of truthful, legitimately
observed information proceed on the counterintuitive theory that
having more facts is bad for society.  However, there are times when
the spread of information does cause great, avoidable harm, and laws
deterring the spread of truthful facts can be the best course in these
instances.  Again, tort law has already laid much of the foundation for
sensible restrictions on dissemination.
This Part begins by considering the nature of harms that flow
from the dissemination of information that was lawfully observed and
collected.  The subsections that follow describe workable dissemina-
tion restrictions on two categories of information: information
revealed in the context of a special relationship, and information that
is “predictably explosive.”  These categories roughly map onto the
common law torts of breach of confidentiality and public disclosure of
private facts.  These categories are not meant to be exhaustive; there
200 A new firm called Evidon is offering the behavioral marketing industry’s first
“assurance platform.”  It organizes industry best practices that would, if followed,
receive Evidon’s trusted seal of approval. Turn Names Evidon Preferred Provider of Com-
pliance Services, PRWEB (May 4, 2011), http://www.prweb.com/releases/prweb2011/
5/prweb8377655.htm.
201 Mike Butcher, Stupid EU Cookie Law Will Hand the Advantage to the US, Kill Our
Startups Stone Dead, TECHCRUNCH EUROPE (Mar. 9, 2011), http://eu.techcrunch.com/
2011/03/09/stupid-eu-cookie-law-will-hand-the-advantage-to-the-us-kill-our-startups-
stone-dead/.  The European cookie law would require any website that uses Google
Analytics to keep track of the number of visitors to a website, who would also have to
comply with the opt-in consent requirements. See also discussion supra note 19. R
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may very well be other types of dissemination restrictions that tend to
promote social welfare.  But by analyzing confidentiality and public
disclosure laws, it will become apparent that restricting the dissemina-
tion of truthful information is sound public policy only in a limited
number of contexts.  This Part ends with a case study on dissemina-
tion and use regulations from the credit reporting context.
A. Conceptions of Harm
Some of the losses routinely identified as “harm” do not look like
redressable injuries after sober reflection.  This is particularly true for
reputation-related injuries.  Since harm, and risk of harm, are neces-
sary prerequisites for tort liability, these infirmities are important and
merit explication.
1. Reputation Damage
Reputational harm and shame are among the most commonly
cited privacy harms.202  The information age has undeniably increased
the availability of reputation-damaging content.  In his book Delete,
Viktor Mayer-Schöenberger argues that the vast collections of digital
information keep us from forgetting the embarrassing things we’ve
done.203  Websites that catalog mug shots204 or highlight moments of
embarrassment205 deny us the comfort we once had that our mistakes
and failings would evaporate from collective memory.  This new state
of affairs has motivated the European Union to define a right to be
forgotten, requiring websites to destroy any personal information at
the request of the subject.206
202 See JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE 120 (2000) (discussing shame as a
basis for harm); DANIEL SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION 114–17 (2007) (discuss-
ing damage to reputation); Lipton, supra note 22, at 503 (discussing gossip and R
embarrassment); Murphy, supra note 46, at 2385 (discussing reputation protection R
with privacy claims).
203 VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER, DELETE 2 (2009).
204 David Kravets, Mug-Shot Industry Will Dig Up Your Past, Charge You to Bury It
Again, WIRED (Aug. 2, 2011, 1:52 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/08/
mugshots/.
205 Sex List Rating Female University Student’s Lovers Becomes Internet Sensation,
MAILONLINE (Oct. 8, 2010, 11:49 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-131
8575/Duke-University-alumni-Karen-Owens-sex-list-internet-sensation.html (“[A] stu-
dent has been left devastated after an elaborate sex list she created . . . became an
internet sensation.”).
206 Matt Warman, Online Right “To Be Forgotten” Confirmed by EU, THE TELEGRAPH
(Mar. 17, 2011, 12:53 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/internet/83880
33/Online-right-to-be-forgotten-confirmed-by-EU.html (“Under the new [EU] legisla-
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Privacy scholars are puzzled that shame and reputational harms
are only reluctantly, if ever, vindicated by U.S. courts.207  Jacqueline
Lipton speculates that lawmakers may fear chilling truthful speech,
and that individuals who have suffered shame and humiliation are
unlikely to demand legal redress, since the process would put their
facts in the spotlight once again.208  Danielle Citron argues that courts
should be more likely than ever to recognize reputational injuries
since the Internet creates a permanent, searchable record of embar-
rassing personal facts.209  But shame, while undoubtedly unpleasant to
the person feeling it, is not always socially undesirable.210
2. Harm Versus Consequence
Reputational damage is usually either a collateral consequence of
past behavior (as when a bad credit history prevents a person from
obtaining a loan211) or the accidental loss produced by an otherwise
functioning system (as when a person’s story is used as a cautionary
tale).212  Take, for example, the woman who is known worldwide as
Dog Poop Girl after she rebuffed the pleas of her fellow subway-riders
to pick up after her dog, which had just made a deposit in the subway
car.213  If her fellow passengers had called her selfish and entitled, the
insults, while stinging, could not possibly require redress.  The insults
tion, users could sue websites for invading their privacy and would have a right to be
entirely “forgotten” online.”).
207 Lipton, supra note 22, at 504; Citron, supra note 10, at 1809. R
208 Lipton, supra note 22, at 504. R
209 Citron, supra note 10, at 1808, 1810.  Citron’s argument makes real sense if the R
Internet allows a large number of micro-invasions to add up to real, actionable
psychic costs.  The question, though, is whether each revelation of embarrassing
information is a small harm, too trivial to be redressable on its own but adding up to a
real psychic harm due to repetition over the Internet (a summation of epsilons), or
whether instead each revelation is not a legal harm at all (a summation of zeroes).
210 But see Laura A. Heymann, The Law of Reputation and the Interest of the Audience,
52 B.C. L. REV. 1341 (2011) (arguing that legal frameworks for reputational interests
must account for the public’s interest in access to the information).
211 Bad credit histories are a surprising mainstay among privacy scholars’ exam-
ples of privacy harm. See Citron, supra note 10, at 1814 (coding a client’s decision not R
to work with somebody in debt as a “privacy invasion”); Lori Andrews, Facebook Is Using
You, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2012, at SR7, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/
05/opinion/sunday/facebook-is-using-you.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all.
212 See Eric Goldman, The Regulation of Reputational Information, in THE NEXT DIGI-
TAL DECADE: ESSAYS ON THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET 293, 295–96 (B. Szoka & A.
Marcus eds., 2010) (discussing in detail the value that reputational information adds
to consumer trust and well-functioning markets).
213 Jonathan Krim, Subway Fracas Escalates Into Test of the Internet’s Power to Shame,
WASH. POST (July 7, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/arti-
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would not be “harm” at all, at least not in the sense that we use that
term colloquially.214  They burden her, but they are the natural social
consequence of her actions.
What happened instead was slightly different.  Dog Poop Girl
became the target of a shaming campaign.  Koreans pored over the
pictures of the incident posted on the Internet via cell phone camera.
Soon her identity, place of employment, and family members’ names
were attached to the story.  She left her job in humiliation, and for the
rest of her life, searching Google for her real name will reveal her
epithet.
Dog Poop Girl’s story is a sad one.  Despite her transgression, she
did not deserve to bear the full brunt of the world’s contempt for
litterers.  This, however, does not make her loss a compensable
one.215  Stories like hers feed the engine of cultural norm-making,
and as unfortunate as the damage might be for her, the deterrent
effect on incivility and inconsiderate behavior will outweigh that dam-
age.  Dog Poop Girl was the unlucky victim in a properly functioning
system.  Though her penalty was out of proportion to her fault, she
could have avoided it by picking up after her dog.  She was the cheap-
est cost avoider, and so her aberrational penalty is equivalent to the
tort defendant who is liable for the full costs of an eggshell plaintiff’s
injury.216
This system, callous as it is, is superior to the alternatives.  A
generic right to be forgotten allows an information subject to insist
that existing, truthful information about her must be destroyed.  Such
a right imposes serious costs on the public.217  It plucks out of the
public domain information that people have determined to be perti-
nent to the evaluation of a person, supplanting instead that person’s
cle/2005/07/06/AR2005070601953.html; see also DANIEL SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF
REPUTATION 1–2 (2007).
214 For strict utilitarians, the disapprobation would be harm.  It would count
against Dog Poop Girl’s utility in the overall calculation of social welfare.  But her
decrease in utility is easily overcome by the deterrent effect that shaming and social
norms have on litterers and dog-owners, by the avoidance of the sizable cost that
would be imposed on the subway passengers if they were constrained from expressing
their opinions, and by the justice and satisfaction the subway passengers would get
from retribution. KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 82, at 12, 18–19. R
215 Privacy scholars have argued that Dog Poop Girl deserves legal recourse. See
Lipton, supra note 22, at 511. R
216 Vosburg v. Putney, 50 N.W. 403 (Wis. 1891). Or, perhaps she is more similar
to the accident victim whose loss of life or limb was caused by non-negligence.  Either
way, we traditionally let the chips fall where they may.
217 See Heymann, supra note 210 (arguing that access to reputations helps reduce
search costs).
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own (self-interested) judgment about what facts should inform public
perception.218  Descriptions and empirical claims would have to give
way to opinion and conjecture.  Credible proof and certainty of
knowledge would be replaced with rumor, speculation, and
deniability.  Social class would be less dynamic; any information that
would tend to blemish a person’s reputation and relative social stand-
ing will be erased, thereby hardening the status quo.219  (Upward
social mobility is, after all, dependent on social downward mobility.)
Also, the risk of moral hazard is not negligible.  A decision to exercise
the right to be forgotten can be driven by perverse incentives, as when
an abusive spouse seeks to have his domestic violence record shielded
from public disclosure.220
This is not to say that concrete privacy harm cannot arise from
the dissemination of information.  In circumstances where the ex ante
expected losses to an information subject are greater than the
expected societal gains, disclosure of personal information can and
should lead to redress.  Reasonable minds are bound to differ when
deciding whether the likely psychic harms outweigh the social gains.
The values on both sides of the scale are inordinately difficult to mea-
sure.  But privacy legal scholars tend to demand avenues of redress in
every instance where a person has suffered a psychic loss.  Conceived
of this way, a right to privacy would be stronger even than a right to
bodily integrity.
The overarching concern motivating reputational harm argu-
ments is that, with rapidly changing technologies and capabilities to
store and process personal data, negative consequences to individuals’
wellbeing are overlooked by courts and lawmakers.  Implicit in this
concern, though, is a strong assumption that losses in the era of big
data automatically count as privacy harm.  Many are simply collateral
consequences.
Nevertheless, just as intrusion constitutes an injury with coherent
theoretical underpinnings, certain types of disclosures also can cause
predictable direct and indirect injury.  In the next two sections, we
218 Robert Post raises a similar objection to Jeffrey Rosen’s claim that Bill Clinton’s
sexual exploits ought to have been kept private.  Robert C. Post, Review Essay, Three
Concepts of Privacy, 89 GEO. L.J. 2087, 2089–90 (2001) (reviewing JEFFREY ROSEN, THE
UNWANTED GAZE (2000)).
219 Whitman, supra note 57, at 1169–70 (heralding, however, the expressive value R
of dignity-based privacy protections).
220 See Sheetz v. The Morning Call, Inc., 946 F.2d 202 (3d Cir. 1991).  Another
example, discussed in Part II, supra, is a police officer’s use of a state wiretap statute to
prevent a citizen from recording an interaction the citizen believes to be corrupt or
unethical.  Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2012).
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explore restrictions on dissemination that successfully target apprecia-
ble harm.
B. Confidences
When personal information is revealed to a professional in a spe-
cial, fiduciary relationship with the subject, as when a client tells a
lawyer an unflattering fact about himself, disclosure restrictions func-
tion like an extension of the zone of seclusion.  When the lawyer
learns the secrets of his client, the client has not abandoned his seclu-
sion.  Instead, he has let the lawyer into it.  The private facts, at least as
disclosed to the lawyer, are still in the client’s control, as if he had
never exposed them in the first place.  The client’s conversation with
his lawyer is different from other private conversations because the
client has reserved, through express agreement or by implication, a
right to confidentiality.
Arguably, dissemination restrictions could be left to private law,
since express agreements of confidentiality can be worked out
between private parties.  However, individuals and society at large ben-
efit so routinely from candor in certain types of relationships that law
has stepped in to create default duty of confidentiality rules.221  Plac-
ing stringent restrictions on doctors to keep their patients’ confi-
dences will on balance serve the public interest by encouraging
candor and minimizing gawking.  But the duty is qualified: in circum-
stances when disclosure would be better, as when others are in foresee-
able danger, the common law either permits disclosure or requires
it.222
Relationships were historically regulated through tort duties and
professional codes of ethics,223 but now a host of federal and state
221 McCormick v. England, 494 S.E.2d 431, 435 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997) (“Being a
fiduciary relationship, mutual trust and confidence are essential.”).  Courts look for a
degree of kinship between the parties, or disparities in age, health, or mental condi-
tions, or disparities in training and experience in order to determine whether two
people are in a fiduciary relationship. See Pottinger v. Pottinger, 605 N.E.2d 1130,
1137 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
222 Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 347 (Cal. 1976) (invoking
duty to warn likely victim of psychotherapy patient); Pate v. Threlkel, 661 So. 2d 278,
282 (Fla. 1995) (invoking duty to warn patients’ children about genetic conditions).
223 The tort of confidentiality does not enjoy the recognition that Prosser’s privacy
torts do, and it does not appear in the Second Restatement.  But many jurisdictions
recognize and enforce the duty of confidentiality in contexts ranging from doctors to
bankers to accountants.  Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy’s Other Path:
Recovering the Law of Confidentiality, 96 GEO. L.J. 123 (2007).  I am in agreement with
Richards and Solove, and with Susan Gilles and Danielle Citron as well, that a clearer
and more robust tort of breach of confidentiality could allow the common law to
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statutes impose some confidentiality rules.  They usually regulate rela-
tionships where the information-receiver has an express or implied
fiduciary responsibility to the information-provider.  The major sector-
specific federal privacy regimes are examples of confidentiality-style
statutes, covering medical providers,224 creditors,225 educators,226
communications service providers,227 banks,228 and entertainment
geared toward children.229
The harm caused by the dissemination of information held in
confidence is three-fold: first, the dissemination constitutes an inva-
sion of seclusion.  If a doctor provided his patient’s medical file to a
curious snoop, the revelation would cause at least as much distress as
if the snoop had stolen a glance without the doctor’s permission (a
traditional intrusion upon seclusion).230  Second, the professional’s
breach of trust may be an independent source of distress.  And third,
because confidentiality duties are imposed in contexts to promote the
candid transfer of inherently sensitive information, dissemination of
confidential information is likely to be used against the subject in
some way.
Scholars focus on the third form of privacy harm as a means of
understanding the goals of laws like HIPAA.  On that basis, they advo-
cate for recognition of dissemination harms for more, or even all, cat-
react to harmful disseminations of personal information. Id.; Citron, supra note 46, at R
1848–50; Susan Gilles, Promises Betrayed: Breach of Confidence As a Remedy for Invasions of
Privacy, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 4 (1995).  The tort of public disclosure of private facts
occasionally provides recourse for confidentiality-style harms. The disclosure tort has
imposed responsibility on the police force to hold information about accident and
crime victims in confidence, as well as the information from cooperative witnesses.
See Catsouras v. Dep’t of Cal. Highway Patrol, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d 352 (Ct. App. 2010)
(providing recovery to a decedent’s family when a paramedic took pictures at the
scene of a deadly accident and sent the pictures to friends and acquaintances on
Halloween).  On the other hand, police are not expected to keep the confidences of
suspects.  Wilson v. Freitas, 214 P.3d 1110 (Haw. Ct. App. 2009).
224 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
191, § 1173, 110 Stat. 1936, 2024–26 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18,
26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).
225 Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2006).
226 Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2006).
227 Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 222 (2006); Stored Communica-
tions Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2702 (2006) (stating that business records may be disclosed to
non-government third parties, but the contents of electronic communications may
not).
228 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6801.
229 Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, id. § 6502.
230 See records-based intrusion cases, supra note 135. R
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egories of information.231  But this second form contains an inherent
tension between society’s interest in having probative information and
a person’s desire to keep information secret precisely because it is pro-
bative.  The first form of harm, by contrast, allows confidentiality-style
regulations to fit comfortably with our commitments to the free flow
of information because, like intrusion, injury from a breach of confi-
dentiality is independent from the utility of the divulged information.
If a doctor talked about a particular patient’s routine appendectomy
at a party, he would violate his patient’s privacy even if the facts were
not particularly embarrassing.
American privacy law is criticized for being fragmented,232 but
the existing statutory schemes typically apply to sectors in which an
imbalance in training or experience justifies the imposition of fiduci-
ary responsibilities.  For sectors that do not have a quasi-fiduciary
responsibility with the consumer, assigning a duty of confidentiality
unduly encumbers relationships that are not ones of unusual trust.233
In addition to lost information, the public would bear the costs of
administering a strong privacy system.  These costs are considerable.
A small hospital with only 400 beds can spend upwards of $500,000 on
HIPAA compliance each year, and for large hospitals the direct
administrative costs are in the millions of dollars.234  Arguably, it is
appropriate to impose these costs on doctors and spread them across
231 Richards, supra note 13, at 1194–1201.  Neil Richards and Daniel Solove sug- R
gest that, if the tort of confidentiality were adopted in the United States to the same
extent it is embraced in the United Kingdom, nearly every relationship could be con-
sidered the basis for a duty of confidentiality—ordinary citizens could be expected to
refrain from divulging information about their friends, and airlines could be
expected to maintain the confidences of their customers.  Richards & Solove, supra
note 223, at 176–78. But see Litman, supra note 10, at 1308–09 (proposing the expan- R
sion of the breach of confidence tort on the basis of the first source of harm—dis-
trust).  Litman predicted that without robust confidentiality-style protection for all
consumer transactions, we would “think twice before making embarrassing purchases
or watching certain pay-per-view movies.” Id. at 1308.  Consumer behavior in the
twelve years that have elapsed since her writing this has proven otherwise.
232 See Lipton, supra note 22, at 510; Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reunifying Privacy Law, R
98 CAL. L. REV. 2007, 2007 (2010).
233 I disagree with scholars who explain the current collection of statutes as impos-
ing privacy restrictions when some forms of information are “regarded as more sensi-
tive than others.”  Lipton, supra note 22, at 510.  Bartenders, personal trainers, and R
friends end up with a lot of special information about the most sensitive aspects of
their customers’ and colleagues’ lives.  It is the nature of the relationship, and not the
nature of the information, that justifies a different treatment for the information held
by doctors and financial advisors.
234 Peter Kilbridge, The Cost of HIPAA Compliance, 348 N. ENG. J. MED. 1423, 1424
(2003).
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the base of health care consumers because the confidentiality duty
promotes truthful medical consultations and leads to optimal care,
but the same reasoning does not hold for our merchants.235
Some existing privacy laws unwisely create confidentiality duties
for relationships with only marginal amounts of trust.  California’s
carpooling privacy statute, for example, imposes criminal liability for
divulging carpool or ridesharing information.236  The Video Privacy
Protection Act (VPPA) imposes criminal and civil liability upon video
rental stores and their employees who disclose customer rental infor-
mation.237  These statutes are often the products of legislation by
anecdote, as when the release of Judge Robert Bork’s video rental
records during his Supreme Court confirmation hearings prompted
the passage of the VPPA.238  The VPPA now demonstrates how over-
reaching confidentiality-style statutes can frustrate a regulated indus-
try’s attempts to expand services or use data in innocuous ways.
Netflix has expended considerable energy, and billable hours, to find
a lawful way for its members to report that they “like” a movie on
Facebook.  The VPPA’s written consent requirements for re-disclosure
of video rental information are so onerous that Netflix has resorted to
lobbying for a change in the law.239  Duties of confidentiality should
be imposed only in the instances where the benefits are known to out-
weigh the considerable costs.
C. Disclosure of Highly Volatile Information
The tort of public disclosure of private facts has an uncertain
future.  Liability for public disclosure is triggered when somebody
gives “publicity” to a private fact, if the matter is highly offensive, and
if the fact is not of legitimate concern to the public.240  Scholars have
struggled to make sense of the public disclosure tort’s interaction with
the First Amendment for decades.  The tort is constructed with a num-
ber of safety valves to ease the inherent tension between the right to
235 Confidentiality duties might be expanded to cover relationships of trust in the
online space.  An online support group, or a website offering customized medical or
legal advice, arguably should have the same responsibilities that apply in real space.
236 CAL. PENAL CODE § 637.6 (West 2010).
237 Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2006).
238 Michael Dolan, The Bork Tapes Saga, THE AM. PORCH, http://www.theamerican
porch.com/bork2.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2012).
239 Adam Clark Estes, Why Robert Bork (Indirectly) Kept Netflix Off Facebook, ATLANTIC
WIRE (July 26, 2011), http://www.theatlanticwire.com/technology/2011/07/why-rob-
ert-bork-indirectly-kept-netflix-facebook/40408 (discussing how the VPAA discour-
aged Netflix from launching Facebook integration in the U.S.).
240 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
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speech and the right to not have one’s story told.  It avoids roping in
gossip and ordinary conversation by requiring the plaintiff to show
that the defendant disclosed the private fact to a broad audience.241
And it also immunizes disclosures of newsworthy information, an
exemption much bemoaned by privacy scholars as the exception that
swallows the rule.242  These exceptions may be helpful for avoiding
constitutional challenges, but they only make it more difficult to
understand what the tort is attempting to accomplish.  If a person is
not at liberty to communicate a piece of information he has, why do
we not constrain this person through confidentiality laws?  And if this
person is too distant from the tort victim to formalize their relation-
ship through confidentiality laws, then what is it that makes the fact
“private”?
Notwithstanding these puzzles, the public disclosure tort serves
important and unique functions.  Consider this hypothetical, based
loosely on the facts of Doe v. Borough of Barrington.243  A heated argu-
ment at a bar in 1987 led to a physical confrontation between Arthur
and Billy.  Arthur said, “Careful!  I’m HIV positive.”  At this time, the
AIDS epidemic was not well understood by the general public.  Later
that night, Billy told Arthur’s neighbors about Arthur’s serostatus.
One of Arthur’s neighbors had young children who attended public
school with Arthur’s children.  She phoned the parents of all of the
other students in the class and spread the news that Arthur has HIV.
Panicked, the other parents decided to keep their children home
from school, fearing they might somehow contract the disease.
Arthur’s children arrived at school to find empty classrooms and
social stigmatization.
These facts demonstrate that the public disclosure tort can target
harm outside the ambit of confidentiality laws.  The disclosure cases
that tend to overcome the default assumptions favoring information
flow usually share two characteristics: first, there is some modicum of
implied use restriction;244 and second, the public will have a predict-
241 In most jurisdictions the “publicity” element requires disclosure to the general
public, but in some states disclosure to an especially important audience will suffice.
See Miller v. Motorola, Inc., 560 N.E.2d 900, 903 (Ill. 1990) (finding that disclosure to
the plaintiff’s work colleagues was sufficient to fulfill the “publicity” element).
242 Citron, supra note 10, at 1829. R
243 729 F. Supp. 376 (D.N.J. 1990).  In the case, the plaintiff’s HIV status was ini-
tially disclosed to a police officer, who then told other people in his department for
no health—or public safety—related reason.
244 Lior Jacob Strahilevitz has shown that courts’ determinations in disclosure
cases tend to track theories of social networks.  If a personal fact is shared with a
support group made up of 20 members, the fact is treated as more private than if it is
shared with 20 unconnected friends.  Strahilevitz’s social network theory is quite use-
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ably irrational reaction to the disclosed facts.  These types of highly
volatile facts lead to consistent overreaction and discrimination.245
Disclosure liability under these conditions avoids conflict with net
public knowledge because highly volatile facts degrade public knowl-
edge instead of improving it.246
Courts face a difficult task in identifying which types of personal
facts are highly volatile.  The lawmakers must have confidence that
the public’s response is not only overwhelmingly negative, but irra-
tionally so.  Sexually transmitted disease (especially HIV and AIDS)
marks one example where the public’s perception of the risks of trans-
mission and fault of the carriers are not in line with reality.247  Homo-
sexuality might be another.248
The trouble is that classifications are unlikely to stay static over
time and are sometimes defused in a single generation.  A strong reg-
ulation that makes sense at one point in time can cause unexpected
problems later.  As an example, California’s HIV privacy law prohibits
the disclosure of HIV test information for any reason, including
through compelled discovery with protective orders.249  At the time of
the law’s passage, this seemed like a wise way to protect HIV-positive
patients and their supportive communities.  However, as the stigma of
positive serostatus diminished, the law began to produce unintended
ful in explaining which contexts might have a modicum of implied use restriction. See
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 919
(2005).
245 Richard Murphy makes the sound argument that overreactions to AIDS and
other phenomena are not necessarily irrational.  Overreaction can occur when the
population remains rationally ignorant about a disease that is difficult to understand
and relatively rare.  Murphy, supra note 46, at 2401. R
246 And, because of the first factor, disclosure torts would avoid imposing liability
when the plaintiff puts no effort into keeping the information private.  This reasoning
lines up with Judge Frank Easterbrook’s argument that reasonable restrictions on
information will limit certain types of information that have the effect of diminishing
the overall quality and quantity of publicly available information.  Frank H. Easter-
brook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of Informa-
tion, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 309, 313 (1981).
247 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 120975 (West 2006); Doe v. Se. Pa. Transp.
Auth., 72 F.3d 1133, 1140 (3d Cir. 1995); Doe v. Borough of Barrington, 729 F. Supp.
376, 381 (D.N.J. 1990); Margo Kaplan, Rethinking HIV-Exposure Crimes, 87 IND. L.J.
(forthcoming 2012).
248 See Sipple v. Chronicle Publ’g Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 665, 670 (Ct. App. 1984)
(finding the disclosure of Sipple’s sexual orientation was a matter of public concern
because the newspaper story was exploring the possible homophobia of President
Ford).  Sipple’s parents disowned him after the national news coverage broke, show-
ing the high stakes when this sort of information is released.
249 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 120975.
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consequences.  For example, the plaintiff in Children’s Hospital v. Work-
ers’ Compensation Appeals Board mysteriously contracted HIV during her
time working at a hospital.250  She presented convincing evidence to
the Workers’ Compensation Board that she did not contract HIV
from her husband, her only sexual partner, but the Board demanded
evidence affirmatively supporting her claim that she contracted the
disease at work.251  The plaintiff subpoenaed her former employer
hospital for a statistical record reporting the number of patients that
passed through her particular hospital ward each year during her
employ.
California’s HIV privacy statute prevented the hospital from com-
plying with her demand.  Because a record of this sort did not yet
exist, the hospital would have to order a member of its staff to go
through patients’ charts to count the number of HIV cases, and even a
staff member could not do so without first securing explicit consent
from every hospital patient.252  At the time of the law’s passage, even
hospital employees may have had a morbid curiosity in the serostatus
of patients, but today it is difficult to believe that a hospital administra-
tor would be unable to maintain professionalism while compiling a
statistical record of this sort.  Since the plaintiff’s claim for worker’s
compensation depended on her access to this evidence, the privacy
statute quashed her chances of receiving pay and, as a result, harmed
a member of the very HIV-positive community it had intended to
help.  State laws regarding homosexuality as a category of libel per se
exhibit a similar problem.253  The common law might be better suited
than legislatures to recognize highly volatile facts without letting that
status ossify and outlast its usefulness.
Privacy advocates and scholars champion dissemination restric-
tions, but when the regulations do not follow the confidentiality
model or the highly volatile fact model, they are usually ill-advised.
The next subsections discuss the problems that can result from over-
zealous dissemination bans using credit markets as a case study.
D. Dissemination Restriction Case Study: Credit Markets
Many Americans have difficulty accessing credit for the first time.
Banks and credit card issuers use debt payment histories to determine
250 Children’s Hosp. & Res. Ctr. Oakland v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 2010
WL 3936050, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 8, 2010).
251 Id. at *2.
252 Id. at *7.
253 Klepetko v. Reisman, 839 N.Y.S.2d 101 (App. Div 2007). But see Yonaty v.
Mincolla, 945 N.Y.S.2d 774 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012) (declining to follow Klepetko).
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credit-worthiness, so without debt histories, college students and low
socio-economic status (SES) individuals are frequently shut out of
mainstream credit markets.254  This is not in the best interests of relia-
ble low-SES applicants who might benefit from a line of credit, nor is
it in the credit issuers’ interests.  But creditors have a difficult time
distinguishing low-risk applicants who lack credit history from those
who pose a high risk of default.  The credit market suffers from an
information problem.  By leaving a significant portion of the Ameri-
can population un-assessable and unscorable, the information prob-
lem does a disservice to creditors and would-be debtors alike.
A recent study by the Political & Economic Research Council
found a new source for measuring creditworthiness: utility bills.255
Utility bill payment histories correlate well with loan repayment, so
adding data on utility payment histories to the calculation of credit
scores improves the scores’ predictive power.  More importantly, util-
ity bills provide a means of creating credit scores for 10% of the previ-
ously unscorable population.256
Privacy advocates have objected to the disclosure of utility bill
data for this purpose because some applicants’ credit scores might
decrease on account of payment histories they did not know were
being tracked.257  It is an odd argument: because consumers are not
given the opportunity to game the credit markets through strategic
behavior, a creditor’s use of a fuller, more accurate set of information
constitutes a privacy violation.  This is another example where collat-
eral consequences of past behavior are mistaken for privacy harm.
Moreover, privacy regulations outlawing the transfer of utility bills in
this context would hinder class mobility.
Better measures of creditworthiness help the poor.  They allow
traditionally overlooked credit applicants to access credit lines, and
just as importantly, they weed out higher-SES credit applicants who
score well on traditional measures but are actually more likely to
254 Ylan Q. Mui, A Deep Dive into Consumers’ Habits: Unregulated Firms’ Use of Shadowy
Tactics can Upend Credit Scores, WASH. POST, July 17, 2011, at A1.
255 MICHAEL TURNER ET AL., YOU SCORE, YOU WIN: THE CONSEQUENCES OF GIVING
CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE, POL. & ECON. RES. COUNCIL (July 2008), available at
http://perc.net/files/downloads/web_layout-you-score.pdf (discussing the use of
utility bills in assessing creditworthiness).
256 Id. at 12.
257 Mui, supra note 254. R
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default.258  Without the utility credit scores, lower-SES applicants
would cross-subsidize higher income applicants.259
Utility payment history reporting for credit scoring is a novel
repurposing of data.  If all business records operated under the same
dissemination restrictions that our medical records do, this new use
would have been overlooked.260  Dissemination restrictions are rarely
the best means of balancing privacy and information interests.
Restrictions that prohibit all uses other than the ones for which the
information was collected are equally problematic.261  On the other
hand, regulations targeting specific misuse can work quite well.
E. Use Restriction Case Study: Credit Reports
Laws prohibiting specific uses of personal information can
achieve the goals of privacy law without significantly curtailing the
flow of truthful information.  If we have reason to believe that a partic-
ular use diminishes social welfare, we can and should craft prohibi-
258 Perhaps this point is best illustrated if we imagine an alternative universe
where credit lenders were not allowed to access any credit or consumer data on their
applicants.  In this case, the creditor would use existing assets and income in order to
determine who got a loan and who did not.  In other words, lower-income applicants
would systematically be denied credit due to lack of collateral.  This would not serve
creditors well, either.  Because of the noise in their algorithm, default rates would
rise, and interest rates would have to increase.
259 This phenomenon is completely overlooked by the National Consumer Law
Center, which concluded that utility credit reporting would adversely affect low-
income credit applicants. JOHN HOWAT, FULL UTILITY CREDIT REPORTING: RISKS TO
LOW INCOME CONSUMERS, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR. 1 (December 2009), available at
http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/credit_reports/credit_reports_full_utility_dec
2009.pdf.  The report argues that, because fourteen percent of households in the
lowest income quintile missed a payment on their utility bill (compared to just over
two percent for the highest income quintile), a credit measure that takes utility bills
into account will disproportionately harm the poor. Id. at 5.  It is true that utility
data, like all measures of creditworthiness, does not fall uniformly across income clas-
ses.  But the consumer organization overlooks the fact that credit scores will rise for
the eighty-six percent of the lowest quintile who did not miss a payment.  The report
also concludes that incorporating utility bills into credit scores will have the effect of
pushing utility bills to the top of the priority list for low-income households, and as a
result these households will reduce their purchases of necessities like food and medi-
cal care. Id. at 4.  This claim is not supported by data in the report, but is an interest-
ing empirical question.
260 Utility credit reports, like all reports used to make credit and hiring decisions,
ought to be paired with regulation allowing for consumers to check for the accuracy
of their records, and to challenge any report believed to contain inaccurate informa-
tion.  The Fair Credit Reporting Act serves as a model for such a scheme.  15 U.S.C.
§§ 1681e(b), 1681i(a)(1) (2006).
261 EU Data Protection Directive, supra note 26. R
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tions on those specific uses.  Antidiscrimination laws are prime
examples of narrow use restrictions.  Antidiscrimination laws restrict
the use of race, age, sex, or medical information for hiring, housing,
and lending decisions because the biases that result from use of this
information, whether statistically rational or not, run against the pub-
lic interest.262  These laws work well on the risk-utility calculator
because they allow information to be exploited for all purposes except
the ones that have been determined to be harmful or risky.263  The
large, rich scholarship on discrimination law explores and debates the
soundness of anti-discrimination measures.264  Curiously, the privacy
and discrimination fields often work in isolation, without overt aware-
ness that regulations called “privacy laws” and those called “antidis-
crimination laws” often aim to prevent the same harms.265
To observe how privacy goals can be achieved through antidis-
crimination policies, consider the utility credit reports described in
the last subsection.  We might wonder whether employers should be
proscribed from using these new utility credit scores.  As a general
matter, we would like employers to differentiate between job appli-
cants on the basis of characteristics that have a relationship to job per-
formance.  If employers are enjoined from making hiring
considerations based on likely performance ability, the redistribution
of jobs and wealth will take place within a pool of applicants such that
it will be slightly harder for higher-performers to obtain the job, and
262 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006).
263 Occasionally these laws will override pragmatism, as when the Americans with
Disabilities Act requires employers to incur additional costs by hiring disabled appli-
cants who require an accommodation, and whose inclusion in the employer’s health
plan may drive up fees.  We do so for expressive and equitable reasons, but such laws
require some forethought and caution, since use regulations of this sort will localize
large costs that might be better spread across society. Id. at §§ 12111–12117.
264 I include just a smattering of the scholarship here. See generally RICHARD
EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS (1991) (discussing the application of the antidis-
crimination principle to employment relationships in the public and private sectors);
Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legiti-
mation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988) (arguing that antidis-
crimination law, has been fairly successful in eliminating the symbolic manifestations
of racial oppression, but has not been able to preclude the continued subordination
of Blacks); John J. Donohue, Anti-Discrimination Law, THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY
OF ECONOMICS (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008).
265 The one exception seems to be the topic of genetic privacy, which inspires
privacy and discrimination scholars to synchronize their efforts. See, e.g., Michael S.
Yesley, Protecting Genetic Difference, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 653, 659–63 (1998) (discuss-
ing various states’ laws regarding genetic privacy and genetic discrimination).
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slightly easier for lower-performers.266  However, employers, like all
humans, are susceptible to biases or unexamined assumptions leading
them to adopt a hiring criterion that does not actually predict future
job performance.  When this happens, wealth and employment are
distributed within the class of job applicants in a way that is capricious
at best, discriminatory at worst, and in any case unmoored from merit
and desert.  Under which of these models do credit reports fall?  Do
credit reports make the labor market more meritocratic or less so?
The federal Fair Credit Reporting Act permits employers to
access credit reports during hiring processes.267  Considering that fed-
eral law prohibits just about everyone else from accessing credit
reports,268 one would think there is abundant evidence that credit
scores correlate strongly with worker competency and job perform-
ance.  While there is evidence that present financial stress correlates
with absenteeism,269 there is little evidence that credit reports predict
the likelihood of success among job applicants.
Even if credit reports were somewhat predictive of job perform-
ance, if the effect is small, social welfare could benefit from limiting
an employer’s access to credit information.  A person who is already
struggling to pay bills and regain control over their finances is vulner-
able to sliding into bankruptcy or poverty if he cannot obtain employ-
ment.  If he does, he will impose negative externalities on others,
including unemployment insurance, the cost of uninsured health
care, and at the extreme, welfare programs.  We also might be con-
cerned about disparate impacts on the disabled and working mothers
since financial crises are often caused by medical or family emergen-
cies.  We might classify the financially insecure as a protected class,
and prevent discrimination on the basis of financial security.  How-
ever, this puts employers in a difficult spot.  They are under pressure
to avoid hiring risky employees not only for financial reasons, but to
avoid liability under Title VII and for the tort of negligent hiring.270
266 George J. Stigler, An Introduction to Privacy in Economics and Politics, 9 J. LEGAL
STUD. 623, 630 (1980).
267 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(3)(B) (2006).
268 Id. § 1681b(a) (“[A]ny consumer reporting agency may furnish a consumer
report under the following circumstances and no other.” (emphasis added)).
269 So-hyun Joo & E. Thomas Garman, The Potential Effects of Workplace Financial
Education Based on the Relationship Between Personal Financial Wellness and Worker Job Pro-
ductivity, 2 PERS. FINS. & WORKER PRODUCTIVITY 163 [pincite] (1998).
270 See John E. Matejkovic & Margaret E. Matejkovic, Whom to Hire: Rampant Misrep-
resentations of Credentials Mandate the Prudent Employer Make Informed Hiring Decisions, 39
CREIGHTON L. REV. 827, 840–42 (2005); Cathie A. Shattuck, The Tort of Negligent Hiring
and the Use of Selection Devices: The Employee’s Right of Privacy and the Employer’s Need to
Know, 11 INDUS. REL. L.J. 2, 5–8 (1989). See generally Meredith J. Fried, Note, Helping
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An information-forcing law might provide a reasonable middle
ground, obligating employers to disclose to their job applicants all
personal information accessed in the course of making a hiring deci-
sion.  Accurate information, and the influence it has on the choices of
both employers and job applicants, is one of the three means of trans-
ferring power identified in Mary Graham’s Democracy by Disclosure.271
Transparency laws are in direct tension with personal privacy, but they
can be unexpectedly consonant with the aim of respectful and digni-
fied treatment.
The credit report case study shows that, with careful considera-
tion for competing public policy concerns, information harms can be
reduced using carefully tailored use restrictions.  But these restrictions
have little in common with the blunt and comprehensive restrictions
proposed by privacy scholars.272
V. CONCLUSION
Tort law holds the solution to vexing problems in privacy law.  Yet
it has been neglected by privacy law scholars, who are on a misguided
quest to constrain the quantity, spread, and repurposing of personal
data.  The extensive regulations they propose come into direct con-
flict with traditional American normative commitments to the free
flow of information.  Rather than questioning the wisdom of their pro-
posals, privacy scholars pursue the dubious goal of changing
America’s normative commitments.
We do not yet understand the benefits and consequences of liv-
ing in a world of unlimited quantities of accurate data—bad portraits,
precise records of e-mails, web search histories, recordings of our own
voices, and nearly every other interaction we have with a computer.
Undoubtedly we know more about each other and ourselves because
of these new information troves.  It is natural, even if it isn’t rational,
to regard change as a presumptive threat.  Privacy scholars, like all
humans, are wired to believe that the existing state of affairs has struck
a good balance between remembering and forgetting, and that tech-
nologies tipping the scale in one direction or the other are more
likely to damage the information ecosystem than to improve it.273
Employers Help Themselves: Resolving the Conflict Between the Fair Credit Reporting Act and
Title VII, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 209 (2000) (discussing employer liability for sexual har-
assment and employer obligations under the Fair Credit Reporting Act).
271 MARY GRAHAM, DEMOCRACY BY DISCLOSURE 140 (2002).
272 LESSIG, supra note 35, at 325–34 (2006); Kang & Buchner, supra note 38, at R
251–53; Richards, supra note 13, at 1149, 1221–22. R
273 Jessica Litman argues that the mere fact that most Americans deplore the col-
lection and selling of personal data is reason enough to regulate or prohibit the prac-
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Behavioral psychologists and economists refer to this as status quo
bias,274 and Lawrence Lessig more vibrantly refers to it as “is-ism”:
what is, is what must be.275  Technology shocks significantly alter the
world, and predictions about the future state will be more pessimistic
than the valuation of the current state, of what we have to lose.
To this point, American lawmakers have been wisely reluctant to
condemn the accumulation of personal information until we fully
understand its consequences.  It is tempting to think that controlling
the production of records so that we have not-too-many-more than we
used to will keep intact the best balance between the virtues of infor-
mation and secrecy, but this is emotion-driven rationalization of the
status quo.  Consider the similarities to the fable of King Thamus,
originally told by Plato and retold in Neil Postman’s Technopoly.276
Theuth, an inventor, approached Thamus with a new invention he
hoped to introduce to the Egyptian people: the written word.  Claim-
ing that the use of letters could make Egyptians wiser by improving
their memories, King Thamus responded:
[Y]ou, who are the father of letters, have been led by your affection
to ascribe to them a power the opposite of that which they really
possess.  For this invention will produce forgetfulness in the minds
of those who learn to use it, because they will not practise their
memory.  Their trust in writing, produced by external characters
which are no part of themselves, will discourage the use of their own
memory within them.  You have invented an elixir not of memory,
but of reminding; and you offer your pupils the appearance of wis-
dom, not true wisdom, for they will read many things without
instruction and will therefore seem to know many things, when they
are for the most part ignorant and hard to get along with, since they
are not wise, but only appear wise.277
The comparison between distrust of personal data and Plato’s dis-
trust of the written word is all the more chill-inducing when we con-
sider the history of personal data collection.  The progenitor of Big
Data was the early accounting records scratched into clay tablets six
thousand years ago by traders in Uruk, an ancient Mesopotamian
tices, though she does not attempt to define what, exactly, is so deplorable.  Litman,
supra note 10, at 1303.  Orin Kerr posits that an unconscious quest to maintain the R
existing equilibrium in relative information power explains the outcomes of Fourth
Amendment cases.  Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amend-
ment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 476, 525–42 (2011).
274 Daniel Kahneman et al., Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Sta-
tus Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193, 197–99 (1991).
275 LESSIG, supra note 35, at 31–37 R
276 NEIL POSTMAN, TECHNOPOLY 3–4 (1992).
277 1 PLATO WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION 563 (Harold N. Fowler trans., 1913).
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city.278  These clay accounting tablets are also one of the first forms of
writing.279  Records really are the building blocks of ideas and
expression.
Though the United States stands alone among developed coun-
tries without omnibus data protection laws, our preference for tort
principles over property rights is eminently sensible.  The sweeping
restrictions of Europe’s Data Protection Directive allow individuals to
control the flow of information regardless of the impact on the rest of
the public.  Tort doctrines find rules that favor the well-being of soci-
ety over the preferences of any one individual.  They begin with a pre-
sumption that private actors may gather and distribute information
freely.  This presumption is overcome in circumstances where privacy
rights improve social welfare.280  Courts and lawmakers are desperate
to find a privacy response suited to the ambiguity and risks of new
technologies without imposing too many restrictions on information
flow.  Even Justice Kennedy, who is not by any stretch of the imagina-
tion a privacy advocate, acknowledges that technology “presents seri-
ous and unresolved issues with respect to personal privacy and the
dignity it seeks to secure.”281  Fortunately, tort has already developed
an attractive, pragmatic option.
Privacy scholars have overlooked the potential of the old com-
mon law intrusion tort to meet new privacy challenges in the informa-
tion age.  Because the interests protected by the intrusion tort are
independent from the public’s interest in probative information, the
tort is more stable than other types of privacy laws.  By clarifying that
the intrusion tort imposes liability for obnoxious observations, as
opposed to the creation of data, this Article has demonstrated that the
intrusion tort is apt to deter offensive, targeted observations, and to
protect the sense of seclusion that people have come to expect even in
a world brimming with data.  Intrusion offers a principled way to
penalize space invaders without unduly taxing the benefits society
enjoys from open information exchange.
278 MATT RIDLEY, THE RATIONAL OPTIMIST 160 (2010).
279 Id.
280 Tort and privacy scholars alike have doubted the viability of tort law to make a
significant impact in the information frontier, especially since tort is regarded as the
disfavored branch of common law, inviting accusations of litigiousness and uncer-
tainty that do not seem to attach to the doctrines of property and contract.  This is
what Anita Bernstein calls the “tort paradox.”  Bernstein, supra note 107, at 1547–52. R
281 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2672 (2011).
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